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Trends in the Regulation of
Investment Companies and
Investment Advisers
Tamar Frankel*
Statutes, rules and enforcement actions are tea leaves
we can read to predict future trends of mutual fund
regulation. While statutes and rules are specific, the
trends they signify are far more speculative. This Essay
engages in such speculation to envision the long-term
implications of the recent new N- 1A disclosure form, I the
plain English Rule, 2 and the profile. 3 More generally, the
Essay speculates on future trends in Securities and
Exchange Commission ("Commission") enforcement, and
predicts a continued and stronger use of informal
enforcement by the Commission.
I. THE LONG-TERM IMPLICATIONS OF THE NEW
N-1A DISCLOSURE FORM, THE PLAIN ENGLISH RULE
AND THE PROFILE
During the past decade, the Commission has made a
fundamental change in its approach to determining mutual fund disclosure rules. Historically, the Commission relied on its own judgment and input from the industry to
* Professor of Law, Boston University School of Law. Professor Frankel
is the author of, among other things, a four-volume treatise titled THE
REGULATION OF MONEY MANAGERS (1978, 1980).
'See Registration Form Used by Open-End Management Investment
Companies, Securities Act Release No. 7,512, 63 Fed. Reg. 13,916
(March 23, 1998) [hereinafter Registration Form Release] (adopting
amendments to Form N-IA to "improve fund prospectus disclosure and
to promote more effective communication of information about funds to
investors").
2 See Plain English Disclosure, Securities Act Release No. 7,497, 63
Fed. Reg. 6,370 (Feb. 6, 1998) [hereinafter Plain English Release]
(establishing plain English rules and principles for writing prospectus
disclosure).
3 See New Disclosure Option for Open-End Management Investment
Companies, Securities Act Release No. 7,513, 63 Fed. Reg. 13,968
(March 23, 1998) [hereinafter Profile Release] (authorizing fund profile
to provide summary of key information about fund).
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determine the content and format of information that issuers should disclose to investors. More recently, however,
the Commission has factored into its decision the wishes
of investors, and has drawn disclosure contents and formats accordingly.
In order to ascertain investor preferences, the
Commission has used focus groups and mass mailings
that investors have answered on their own initiative or at
the encouragement of others (for example, fund complex
advisers). The Commission has also increased the use of
the media, and polls and marketing methods designed to
gauge public opinion. In sum, rather than relying only on
its own judgment and industry suggestions on what
investors need to know, the Commission sought investors'
opinions about the substance, format and language of the
information they want to receive, and those opinions have
led to changes in disclosure requirements: modification of
Form N-1A, emphasis on plain English, diverse forms of
prospectuses, and permission to use profiles.
There are weighty arguments for paying attention to the
desires of investors. Arguably, the securities acts covering
securities transactions are designed to substitute for the
rule of caveat emptor in contract law because investors
cannot directly negotiate with issuers and ask them for
information. Investors' questions are therefore determined
by Congress and the Commission. To the extent that the
Commission can determine (more or less) what
information investors wish to receive, it should follow
these wishes. One might argue, however, that the purpose
of the securities acts is not merely to overcome the absence
of direct negotiations but to entice investors to engage in
securities transactions. These transactions are highly
complex; investment decisions require a substantial
amount of information, which may deter investors from
engaging in securities transactions. Because securities
markets are so important to our economy and political
system, the government provides investors with support
and incentives to engage in securities transactions.
Government interference in this case is necessary as it is
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in the case of the manufacture and distribution of drugs
and poisons. Both can heal and kill. Because both
arguments make sense, I suggest that the Commission's
role is not fully abdicated to investors' desires (or the
industry's desires), but that its decisions should present a
mix of all three inputs: those of the investors, those of the
industry, and those of the Commission as guardian of the
public trust in the markets.
In addition to seeking investors' input on the substance
and format of the information investors should receive
from issuers, the Commission has initiated a movement to
educate investors in investment decision-making. This
new two-pronged approach can have serious implications
for investors. The securities acts remove their protective
mantle from investors that have relevant information
about the issuers and the sophistication to evaluate this
information. The movement to provide information that
investors choose and to educate them may increase the
number of investors who are not covered by the protection
of the securities acts. This is designed to speculate about
the implications of the Commission's new approach rather
than to criticize it.

A. FROM LEGAL ENGLISH TO PLAIN ENGLISH AND
INVESTOR EDUCATION

Investors have long complained that prospectuses are
not readable. The Commission has recently responded by
a requirement to substitute plain, everyday English for the
legal English used by lawyers and the courts. 4 The
Commission has also taken the initiative to help investors
understand the information on which they make their
investment decisions by offering them educational
materials and pressing issuers to educate investors by
4 See Plain English Release, 63 Fed. Reg. at 6,370 (establishing plain
English disclosure rules).
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accessible plain English information about investment
options. 5
A requirement that fund disclosure be in plain English
has its drawbacks. It introduces legal uncertainty because
the plain English of new disclosure documents may be
subject to different judicial interpretations than the legal
English of the past. This uncertainty may be detrimental to
both issuers and investors, depending on the extent to
which it would lead to litigation and the outcome of
litigation based on the new texts.

B. FROM A UNIFORM FORMAT TO A DIVERSE DISCLOSURE
FORMAT; FROM A SINGLE DOCUMENT (PROSPECTUS) TO A
BIFURCATED DOCUMENT (PROSPECTUS AND A STATEMENT OF
ADDITIONAL INFORMATION)

Heeding investor preferences, the Commission has
allowed a diversity of disclosure documents, reflecting the
diverse investor population and the varied information
that different investors desire to receive before making
their investment decisions. Some investors prefer detailed
information while others seek simpler, more general
information. Some investors buy or redeem shares after
conducting their own research while others rely
exclusively on the advice of investment advisers and
brokers. Many investors fall within the two extremes.
Consequently, the Commission allowed issuers to offer
investors different types of disclosure documents in
different sequences. 6 Issuers have adopted the variety of
See generallyJames A. Fanto, The Contributionof the Fund Profile to
Investor Education, 1 VILL. J. L. & INV. MANAG'T 59 (1999) (discussing
benefits of investor education and plain English initiative).
6There are two times when a fund can provide an investor with
disclosure documents, before an investment decision is made, and after

the decision is made. A fund may provide an investor with any and all
types of disclosure documents before an investment decision is made advertising, a fund profile, a prospectus with or without a Statement of

Additional Information (SAI). However, a fund may not accept money
from an investor (permit an investment decision to be made) without
first providing the investor with a profile or prospectus. If an investor
makes an investment decision without having received a prospectus
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disclosure formats permitted by the Commission. In part,
the diverse format benefits issuers by reducing their costs
and increasing their flexibility in designing more effective
marketing materials.
These changes also affected the priorities and placement
of information. One example relates to disclosure of
7
conflicts of interest, including soft dollar arrangements.
Logically, disclosure of conflicts of interest helps investors
(but after receipt of a profile) the fund must provide the investor with a
prospectus with confirmation of the purchase. See Profile Release, 63
Fed. Reg. at 13,969 ("An investor deciding to purchase fund shares
based on the Proposed Profile would receive the fund's prospectus with

the purchase confirmation."). A fund is not required to ever provide a
potential investor with any document other than a prospectus. All other
disclosure documents are optional. See icl. at 13,971 (noting that profile
is optional summary prospectus under section 10(b) of the Securities
Act, but prospectus remains primary disclosure document). Section
10(b) of the Securities Act provides in part:
In addition to the prospectus permitted or required in subsection (a)
of this section, the Commission shall by rules or regulations deemed
necessary or appropriate in the public interest or for the protection of
investors permit the use of a prospectus ... which omits in part or
summarizes information in the prospectus specified in subsection (a)
of this section.
15 U.S.C. § 77j(b) (1998).
7 See Registration Form Release, 63 Fed. Reg. at 13,931 ('Ihe Proposed
Amendments also would no longer require a fund to state in its
prospectus, if applicable, that the fund engages in brokerage
transactions with affiliated persons and allocates brokerage transactions
based on the sale of fund shares."). Disclosure of these soft dollar
arrangements shifted to the SAI because "the Commission believes [they]
are only of minimal importance to typical fund investors." Id.
The term "soft dollar arrangement" generally refers to a "triangular
relationship between a money manager, his accounts and the broker."
See Lee H. Pickard, Institutional Portfolio Execution: Soft Dollar
Arrangements, 8 INSIGHTS 22 (Aug. 1990) (explaining that "money
manager directs amount of portfolio commissions to broker ... in
return for execution services and research used by the money manager
in making investment decisions on behalf of his client accounts.").
These soft dollar arrangements are generally permitted under section
28(e) of the Securities Exchange Act. See 15 U.S.C. § 78bb(e) (1998)
(providing that it is not unlawful to pay member of exchange, broker, or
dealer a commission for "effecting a securities transaction in excess of
the amount of commission another member of an exchange, broker, or
dealer would have charged for effecting that transaction").
In addition, the payment of commissions in these soft dollar
arrangements is governed by section 17(e) of the Investment Company
Act which provides:
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choose their fiduciaries; investors may decide to avoid
investing in funds whose advisers engage in conflicts of
interest. In addition, such disclosure may preclude
violations; if advisers must disclose their conflicts, they
may avoid the conflicts altogether. Further, such
disclosure facilitates legal enforcement actions; if advisers
fail to disclose conflicts of interest, that failure per se
constitutes a violation of the law.
However, many investors are not particularly interested
in their fiduciaries' conflicts of interest. For the most part,
in the United States investors trust the system, at least
until they find that their trust in their fiduciaries was
abused. Information about conflicts of interest is of
interest after the fact, to the "private attorney generals"
(the plaintiffs' bar), the enforcement arm of the
8
Commission, and the courts.
It shall be unlawful for any affiliated person of a registered investment
company or any affiliated person of such person ...
(2) acting as broker, in connection with the sale of securities to or by
such registered company or any controlled company thereof, to
receive from any source a commission, fee, or other remuneration for
effecting such transaction which exceeds (A) the usual and customary
broker's commission if the sale is effected on a securities exchange, or
(B) 2 per centum of the sales price if the sale is effected in connection
with a secondary distribution of such securities, or (C) 1 per centum
of the purchase or sale price of such securities if the sale is otherwise
effected unless the Commission shall, by rules and regulations or
order in the public interest and consistent with the protection of
investors, permit a larger commission.
15 U.S.C. § 80a-17(e) (1998). Rule 17e-1 defines the "usual and
customary broker's commission" as the term is used in section
17(e)(2)(A). See 17 C.F.R. § 270.17e-I (1998) (providing in part that
commission does not exceed usual and customary broker's
commission, if it is "reasonable and fair" compared to commissions
received by other brokers in comparable transactions).
8 The Investment Company Act of 1940 vested the Commission with
the duty to determine whether conflict of interest transactions would
benefit investors. In the 1980s, approval of many transactions of this
sort was transferred to funds' boards of directors and enforcement was
relegated to the plaintiffs' bar. Disclosure was one of the mechanisms to
reduce the plaintiffs' information costs and facilitate enforcement of
fiduciary duties. This technique was one of the reasons prospectuses
became longer and less readable.
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In light of investors' priorities, the Commission has
banished the conflict of interest disclosure to the
Statement of Additional Information (SAI), 9 which reaches
only a fraction of the investor population - those who ask
for it. In the SAL, legal language is often still in bloom, for
plaintiffs' lawyers to search for information on which to
base claims, and the Commission's staff to look for
evidence of wrongdoing. Thus, the SAI has retained to
some extent the flavor of the prospectus of the past: the
shield against, and basis for litigation.
C. FROM TRADITIONAL TEXTUAL RISK DISCLOSURE
TO GRAPHIC PRESENTATIONS AND MORE SPECIFIC
RISK DESCRIPTION

Risk disclosure is not only affected by the plain English
requirement, but also by the new item in Form N- 1A,
requiring graphic presentations of volatility of the
portfolio, and to a lesser extent, risk. Arguably, requiring
plain English and graphic description of risk raises the
issuers' risk of liability. Hedging language that describes
risks seems to have been an effective strategy to protect
issuers against liability, at least in some courts. 10
9See Registration

Form Release,

63

Fed. Reg.

at

13,929-931

(explaining that some disclosure of fund management and organization
was moved to the SAI because it was "not necessary for a typical fund
investor"). A mutual fund may, but is not required to, have an SAI as
part of its registration statement. An SAI is not a prospectus, but if a
fund includes information in the SAI that it would otherwise be required
to include in its prospectus, the fund must offer to provide, and provide
upon request, the SAI to investors. See id. at 13,917 (stating that goal of
SAI was to provide investors "a prospectus that is substantially shorter
and simpler, so that the prospectus clearly discloses the fundamental
characteristics of the particular investment company").
1
°Under the "bespeaks caution" doctrine, "where an offering
statement, such as a prospectus, accompanies statements of its future
forecasts, projections and expectations with adequate cautionary
language, these statements are not actionable as securities fraud." In re
Donald J. Trump Casino Sec. Litig., 793 F. Supp. 543, 549 (D.N.J.
1992), aff'd, 7 F.3d 357 (3d Cir. 1993), cert. denied, 510 U.S. 1178
(1994). Almost all circuit courts have adopted the doctrine in some
form. See Jennifer O'Hare, Good Faith and the Bespeaks Caution
Doctrine: It's Not Just A State of Mind, 58 U. PITt. L. REV. 619, 629 &
n.51 (1997) (noting that all circuits except Fourth, Tenth and District of
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However, the judicial trend in the courts may shift to
require more specific explanations.1 1 Specific explanations
facilitate investors' investment decisions.
Perhaps we might witness more emphasis by issuers on
risk, as they become convinced that promising less (not
merely hedging after promising more) may be a better longterm strategy. Unlike the sales force that may focus on
"spot sales," issuers seek to build their credibility
with
investing communities. Issuer credibility is crucial today
because investors have a continuous relationship with
mutual funds and their investment advisers, and investors
continuously make substantial investments in the volatile
equity markets. By promising less and shifting the
decision on the level of risk to investors, issuers are less
likely to be blamed for losses, and more likely to be trusted
by investors.

Columbia Circuits have adopted doctrine; district courts in Tenth
Circuit have adopted doctrine; Fourth Circuit has cited approvingly
cases applying doctrine); id. at 628 & n.45 (citing cases); see also 15
U.S.C. §§ 77z-2 & 78u-5 (Supp. II 1996) (codifying safe harbor for
forward-looking statements).
I See In re Trump, 793 F. Supp. at 554 (limiting application of
doctrine to "precise cautionary language which directly addresses itself
to future projections, estimates or forecasts in a prospectus"). In
affirming the district court's holding, the Court of Appeals for the Third
Circuit stated that "a vague or blanket (boilerplate) disclaimer which
merely warns the reader that the investment has risks will ordinarily be
inadequate to prevent misinformation." 7 F.3d at 371-72 (adding that
"[t]o suffice, the cautionary statements must be substantive and
tailored to the specific future projections, estimates or opinions in the
prospectus which the plaintiffs challenge"); see also Rubinstein v.
Collins, 20 F.3d 160, 167-68 (5th Cir. 1994) (applying doctrine following
fact- and case-specific approach and stating, "cautionary language is
not necessarily sufficient, in and of itself, to render predictive
statements immaterial as a matter of law"); Furman v. Sherwood, 833
F. Supp. 408, 415 (S.D.N.Y. 1993) (requiring disclosure of assumptions
on which predictions are based); Ballan v. Upjohn Co., 814 F. Supp.
1375, 1382 (W.D. Mich. 1992) (restricting application of doctrine to
financial information; defendants allegedly concealed data concerning

drug side effects); O'Hare, supra note 10, at 643 n.135 (noting
disagreement over whether bespeaks caution doctrine "would protect
an issuer if the issuer did not believe its forward-looking statement").
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D. FROM COMMISSION AND INDUSTRY SUBJECT MATTER
PREFERENCES TO EMPHASIS ON INVESTOR SUBJECT
MATTER PREFERENCES

The substance of required information items has
changed to accommodate investor preferences. For
example, information about issuers' past performance,
which the Commission has prohibited for decades, is now
allowed, even though past performance is difficult to
12
quantify and is not a predictor of future performance.
Yet, investors have consistently asked for this information.
They may have done so perhaps because past performance
may demonstrate the issuers' and advisers' ability to
choose effective and creative portfolio managers. Past
performance presented in a standard form may help
investors compare the performance of funds long-term.
The implication of this change is difficult to gauge.
Whether this information is in fact misleading investors
may never be known.
E. FROM THE PROSPECTUS AS AN INSTRUMENT FOR
INVESTMENT PROFESSIONALS TO A TOOL FOR
"Do IT YOURSELF" INVESTORS

The trend to provide investors' choice of information
seems to imply that investors should make their own
decisions as a matter of policy. The changes in the
language, format and substance of the prospectuses and
disclosure rules, and the emphasis on investor education
seem to aim at encouraging investors to adopt a "do it
yourself" mode. This new trend is likely to continue.
Paternalistic designs, such as defined benefit plans, are
replaced by 401(k) plans, which increase the involvement
of savers-investors in investment decisions. The trend is
also demonstrated by the proposed privatization of all or
part of social security savings.
12 See Registration Form Release, 63 Fed. Reg. at 13,951-952
(providing that management discussion of fund performance over the
last ten years be included in Form N-IA).
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There are two interesting related implications from this
trend. One relates to the public policy concerning
specialization and investors' reliance on the advisory and
management industry and the importance of written
information and advice to a large population of investors.
The other implication relates to investors' protection.
The recent policy of encouraging "do it yourself"
investors constitutes a fundamental shift from a strong
public policy to promote specialization, supporting
investors who rely on trained professionals. A large
percentage of investors resort to broker-dealers and
investment advisers to make investment decisions for
them or with them. Such investors are either
unsophisticated and hard to educate, or are not interested
in devoting time and effort to self-education and selfinvestment management. These investors do not want a
"do it yourself" package. They want reliable, trustworthy
professional advice, oral or discretionary. For investors
dependent upon such professionals, prospectuses are of
little relevance, at least until investors decide to sue.
As to protection, these investors seek strict regulation of
those who offer them advice. The new trend may help in
this respect. Government cannot as strictly regulate oral
disclosure by sales personnel and investment advisers as
it can regulate disclosure. Educated investors with
adequate information may help regulate the professionals.
An alternative or at least supportive role can be played by
the employers of the sales personnel. Thus, at the urging
of the Commission, Congress authorized the Commission
to sanction broker-dealers for failure to supervise their
employees. 13 The Investment Advisers Act of 1940 places a
similar duty on investment advisers.' 4 To what extent
13See Securities Acts Amendments of 1964, Pub. L. No. 88-467,
§ 6(b), 78 Stat. 565, 571-72 (codified as amended at 15 U.S.C.

§ 78o(b)(4)(E) (1996)).

14 See 15 U.S.C.A. § 80b-3(e)(5) (West Supp. 1998). For a discussion of
supervision in the securities regulatory regime, see John H. Walsh,
Right the First Time: Regulation, Quality, and Preventive Compliance in
the Securities Industry, 1997 COLUM. Bus. L. REv. 165, 171-206.
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investor education will raise the level of protection remains
to be seen.
At the same time, alternatives to disclosure as a means
of enforcement seem to appear on the horizon. There is a
growing focus on sales personnel, fund directors and
investment advisers, by a possible increase of the
strictness of their fiduciary duties, including a revision of
their fees. Another trend that seems to point at
strengthening the sales personnels' duties is already in
sight involving the duties of employers to supervise their
employees. These are not new areas of the law, but they
seem to acquire attention, and that attention may
continue.
A second implication of the trend to encourage investors
to "do it themselves" relates to investor protection. A
strong policy of encouraging investors to self-educate, selfinform, and self-regulate their advisers, and to make their
own investment decisions, may reduce their protection, as
the cost of protection shifts to investors. The fact that
investors get the information they want in a readable form
and obtain enhanced education implies a shift in
responsibility to them. With this information and added
sophistication, if they make the wrong decisions, they have
only themselves to blame. Even with all its difficulties, the
trend towards "do it yourself" investment decisions and
responsibility is likely to continue in the foreseeable
future.
H. TRENDS IN REGULATORY APPROACH
The Commission has increasingly refined and diversified
its regulatory approach, and this trend is likely to
continue. One can view the trend as a movement to reduce
the Commission's direct regulation and use alternatives to
achieve its regulatory goals.
The trend toward informal regulatory approaches by the
Commission started long ago, perhaps from the day the
Commission was established. For example, the drafters of
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the Securities Act of 1933 envisioned a process in which
issuers would file registration statements and the
Commission would pass judgment on those registration
statements. Soon thereafter, the Commission established
a new process by which registrants had an opportunity to
redraft the statements pursuant to staff comments. 15
In the early 1970s, the Commission staff adopted a
policy of publishing no-action letters which enabled it to
obtain advance information about industry plans and
prevent some violations of the law by providing industry
with safe harbors before the fact and a source of law with a
limited precedential value. 16 About the same time the staff
and the industry through the American Bar Association
started a dialogue that resulted in more constructive
comments on the Commission's proposed rules by the bar.
These comments were more useful and therefore more
acceptable to the staff. This type of relationship has
encouraged the Commission's development and use of
informal enforcement mechanisms.
A. INFORMAL ENFORCEMENT MECHANISMS
The Commission has continued to develop different
means for informal enforcement. It has increased the use
of a public expression of concern over certain industry
practices in the news media or by a "Dear Matt" letter: a
letter to Matthew Fink, the president of the Investment
Company Institute (ICI). Similarly, the Chairman and the
15 Notwithstanding the different process, the Commission does not
seem to have become a captive of the industry or the issuers. One

explanation may be that issuers come and go and they have little
opportunity to develop ongoing relationships with the Commission
staff. However, the same may not be said with respect to the investment
banking and investment management communities. Still, cooperation
does not seem to result in capture perhaps because the industries as a
whole are anxious to maintain the Commission's credibility as regulator
and thereby the trust of investors in the industry communities.
16 See Thomas P. Lemke, The SEC No-Action Letter Process, 42 Bus.
LAw. 1019, 1021 (1987) (stating that importance of no-action process
increased significantly in early 70s when the Commission determined
that no-action letters should be public).
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Commissioners accept speaking engagements. The
Chairman holds "town meetings" to meet with investors.
The staff appears at seminars, ALI-ABA courses, and ICI
meetings, eagerly attended by industry, its lawyers and the
media. In these communications the Commission and its
staff state their positions, explain their decisions, and give
fair warning about developing industry practices that are
deemed violations. The Commission has also continued its
monitoring of new problematic industry practices by
noting industry's exemptions and no-action requests, and
listening carefully to industry's presentations, and
information from traditional sources.
Informal enforcement of this type has numerous
advantages. First, it is effective in many cases. For
example, after the Commission announced its decision to
examine the soft dollar practices of the industry some
lawyers experienced an avalanche of concerned clients'
calls wondering how they could correct their practices,
especially when they suspected that those practices were
too lax. The mere announcement of the investigation
produced substantial corrections.
To be sure, the announcement could have also produced
more effective secret illegal practices. However, in an
industry that is dependent on public confidence and
recognizes the value of perceived tight regulation the
chances of concealment on a large scale by successful
fund advisers is unlikely. In addition, the industry
recognizes that formal enforcement may lead to serious
financial consequences; correcting lax practices is far
more cost-effective and less risky.
Second, these communications are cost effective,
relative to other enforcement mechanisms. They reduce
enforcement costs for the Commission, industry and the
courts. I believe, although I have no proof, that these
announcements induce far more compliance and
corrections than would after-the-fact, more formal
proceedings.
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Third, informal enforcement by way of public communications enhances the legitimacy of the Commission's formal enforcement actions. Such announcements meet
many of the criteria for law: the announcements are usually clear and clarify the law, they are public, they are prospective, they put the industry and public on notice and
they give fair warning about the Commission's future approaches with respect to perceived problems.
Fourth, informal enforcement of this sort sometimes
helps the Commission sidestep serious mistakes highlighted by public reaction to informal communications.
Fifth, informal enforcement enables the Commission to
design its enforcement and the law in a more flexible
manner. This flexibility is crucial in light of the change in
the Commission's regulatory focus dictated by Congress. 17
The Commission is becoming a mediator among the
conflicting interests in the marketplace (investors, the
industry, the issuers) rather than an advocate of one
market segment (small investors). It is difficult to
articulate the reasons for choosing a particular balance
among these interests. It is easier and more effective to test
the waters before, or perhaps in lieu of, a formal statement
of the law.
Informal law-making may present problems especially if
informality is coupled with lack of transparency. The law
may become less clear; some parties may obtain
preferential treatment; decisions may be postponed,
allowing regulators to avoid responsibility. These dangers
seem to be avoided for now. Informal enforcement is only
public and addresses the industry or a segment of the
industry rather than individual actors, and law proper is
rarely announced informally. In addition, rules preclude
lack of transparency. For example, the staff of the
7

See H.R. REP. No. 104-622, at 16 (1996) (stating that 1996
legislation "seeks to promote efficiency, competition, and capital
formation in the capital markets without compromising investor
1

protection" through a number of methods, including, "reducing
regulatory burdens on the mutual fund industry"), reprinted in 1996
U.S.C.C.A.N. 3877, 3878.
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Commission may not speak at meetings that are not open
to the public.

B.

18

USE OF PRIVATE SECTOR ENFORCERS

Private sector enforcers have played an increasingly
important role in the securities areas. Accountants certify
an issuer's financial statements and attorneys can sue the
institutional agents of the issuer (the board of directors
and officers) on behalf of a class and the issuer. In
addition, the staff of the Commission has at times
conditioned exemptions under the Investment Advisers
Act of 1940 on a reputable accounting firm certification
that the investment adviser has put in place the necessary
control mechanisms.19 A similar delegation of preventive
enforcement power to rating agencies appears in rule 3a-7
under the Investment Company Act of 1940, exempting
certain Special Purpose Vehicles used to securitize
financial assets on condition that the securities of the
exempt issuer are rated. Recently, the Commission
proposed that accountants be required to certify as to the
preparation of certain broker-dealers in solving the Year
2000 problem. 20 The Commission has also begun to
emphasize the duties of investment bankers, investment
advisers and other actors in the markets to supervise their
18 For example, the staff may not participate in meetings organized by
law firms for clients. See 15 U.S.C. § 552b(b) (1998) (providing that
except in certain instances, "every portion of every meeting of an agency
shall be open to public observation"). Public meetings, however, may
involve entrance fees.
19 See 15 U.S.C. § 80b-6a (1998) (stating that Commission may
exempt persons or transactions from provisions of Investment Advisers
Act if such exemption is "necessary or appropriate in the public interest
and
consistent with the protection of investors").
20
See Reports to be Made by Certain Brokers and Dealers, Exchange
Act Release No. 39,724, 63 Fed. Reg. 12,056, 12,062 (Mar. 12, 1998)
(proposing rule requiring accountant's opinion for broker-dealer's
assertions regarding Year 2000 problem); see also Reports to be Made
by Certain Brokers and Dealers, Exchange Act Release No. 40,164, 63
Fed. Reg. 37,709, 37,710 (July 13, 1998) (requesting additional
comments).
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employees and prevent violations of the law.2 1 This trend to
delegation is likely to continue.
C. EXAMINATIONS
The Commission has also used a more formal
enforcement tool through examinations of investment
advisers and mutual funds. These examinations can be
announced or unannounced. Examinations were less
effective in the past because the Commission's resources
could not match the need. In 1996 Congress reduced the
Commission's burden by transferring the regulation of
small investment advisers and investment companies to
the states. 2 2 Thus, examinations have become far more
effective. In addition, the staff has developed examinations
targeted to a particular problem, which results in an
effective way to address the problem.
The Commission has recently created an Office of
Compliance, and moved all of its examiners to that Office.
This move indicates the Commission's increased attention
to examinations. Examiners perform an educational
function as well as a preventive enforcement function.
They take the position that a transgression that is
disclosed and that has been corrected will be treated with
far more leniency than a transgression that has not been
disclosed and has not been corrected but rather has been
concealed.
See Walsh, supra note 14, at 171-206 (discussing supervision in
securities regulatory regime, including Commission enforcement
actions
against broker-dealers and advisers).
22
See National Securities Markets Improvement Act of 1996, Pub. L.
No. 104-290, 110 Stat. 3416 (1996) (codified in scattered sections of the
United States Code). One of the amendments made by the 1996 Act was
the Investment Advisers Supervision Coordination Act which
transferred the regulation of small investment advisers and investment
companies to the states. See Rules Implementing Amendments to the
Investment Advisers Act of 1940, Investment Advisers Act Release No.
1,633, 62 Fed. Reg. 28,112, 28,113 (May 22, 1997) (adopting new rules
to implement provisions of Coordination Act that reallocate regulatory
responsibilities for investment advisers between the Commission and
the states).
21
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Clearly, such concealment increases the Commission's
enforcement costs and is discouraged. However, the
disclosure and especially the correction sends a signal of
approval and an incentive to industry to "self-correct."
This signal is also strengthened by the Commission's
incentives to the industry to "self-regulate." This means
not only through a self-regulatory organization but mainly
through encouraging compliance with the Commission's
regulations by large fund complexes and other large
industry actors. As these actors become larger, the cost to
the Commission to monitor them far exceeds their internal
costs for monitoring and prevention. Large industry actors
also have at their disposal added sanctions for employees'
violations; such as limitations on promotion and bonuses,
and loss of employment.

D. TECHNOLOGY
Technology also affects both regulation and disclosure.
While anti-fraud enforcement is more difficult on the
Internet because the source of information can be
anonymous, technology can be used to detect fraudulent
statements and the Commission has enhanced its
monitoring of the investment community through the use
of new technologies, such as scanning the Internet. 23 The
Commission has also provided investors with a Web site
for information, answers to their inquiries and
complaints. 24
23 See Will Morrow, Is the Internet Participatingin Securities Fraud?:
HarshRealities in the Public Domain, 72 TUL. L. REv. 2203, 2210 (1998).
In addition, there is a strong movement by international regulators to
cooperate in cross-border frauds. See Tanya Epstein, et al., Securities
Fraud, 35 AM. CRIM. L. REv. 1167, 1209 (1998) (noting that the
Commision "currently has entered into 29 agreements with foreign
counterparts for information sharing and cooperation").
24
See U.S. Securities and Exchange Commission (visited Nov. 24,
1998) <http://www.sec.gov> (providing an extensive Web site for
investors).
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III. CONCLUSION

Informal enforcement mechanisms suggest a strong
undercurrent that is likely to continue for some time,
The
breakdown.
market
catastrophic
barring
Commission's current approach tends to limit its formal
regulatory actions, in perception and reality.
Informality tends to obscure the enforcement power
behind advice, suggestions, and educational materials.
Coaching investors into a "do it yourself' mode and
developing the use of technology and automation for
trading in securities point to limitations on formal
regulatory actions. In sum, the Commission's recent
actions signal a preference for a cooperative mode of
regulation, and an informal exercise of government power,
backed by possible exercise of ultimate direct power.
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Straightening Out Strougo: The
Maryland Legislative Response to
Strougo v. Scudder, Stevens &
Clark, Inc.
James J. Hanks, Jr.*
In May 1997, Senior United States District Judge
Robert W. Sweet ignited a firestorm in the investment
company world with his holding in Strougo v. Scudder,
Stevens & Clark, Inc.l that, under Maryland law, receipt of
"substantial compensation" in directors' fees
for serving
on the boards of several investment companies registered
under the Investment Company Act of 1940 (the
"Investment Company Act" or the "Act")2 with the same
investment adviser "call[ed] into question the director's
independence from the manager of that complex." 3 As a
result, Judge Sweet excused the plaintiff-shareholder from
making a demand on the Board of Directors of the Brazil
Fund, Inc., (the "Brazil Fund" or the "Fund")4 before filing
a derivative action challenging an offering by the Fund to
its shareholders of rights to buy more stock, which would
have had the collateral result of increasing the investment
adviser's asset-based fees because the sale of stock would
have increased the Fund's assets.
The reasoning of the court's decision in Strougo
implied that in any action affecting the investment
adviser's interests, directors
receiving substantial
compensation (possibly as a result of serving on multiple
*James J. Hanks, Jr., is a partner in the Baltimore office of Ballard
Spahr Andrews & Ingersoll, LLP, and an Adjunct Professor of Law at
Cornell Law School. Mr. Hanks is the author of MARYLAND CORPORATION
LAW (Supp. 1998).
'964 F. Supp. 783 (S.D.N.Y. 1997), reargument denied (Aug.
18, 1997).
2 15 U.S.C. §§ 80a-1-80a-64 (1998).
3Strougo, 964 F. Supp. at 795.
4The Brazil Fund is a closed-end investment company advised by
Scudder, Stevens & Clark, Inc. See id. at 787 (noting that shares of the
Fund trade on the New York Stock Exchange).
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boards of commonly advised funds) would not be
disinterested and, thus, their decisions would be open to
attack under the standard of care for directors of Maryland
corporations set forth in section 2-405.1 of the Maryland
General Corporation Law (MGCL).5 Section 2-405.1(a) of
the MGCL requires that a director of a Maryland
corporation perform his duties: "(1) [i]n good faith; (2) [iun a
manner he reasonably believes to be in the best interests
of the corporation; and (3) [with the care that an ordinarily
prudent person in a like position would use under similar
circumstances." 6 Section 2-405.1(a) was adopted by the
General Assembly of Maryland in 1976 and is derived,
almost word for word, from former section 8.30(a) of the
7
Model Business Corporation Act.
The court also emphasized that because only one of
the directors did not serve on multiple commonly advised
boards, the Fund's board could not, under the MGCL,
appoint a committee of disinterested directors to consider
the plaintiff-shareholder's demand.8 The MGCL, at the
time of the relevant events, provided that the minimum
number of directors to constitute a board committee was
two. 9 Following Judge Sweet's decision, the same plaintiff
filed a very similar complaint on behalf of a different
closed-end fund, the Brazil Equity Fund, Inc., against its
directors and the same investment adviser, seeking to
5

MD. CODE ANN. CORPS. & ASS'NS § 2-405.1 (1998).

6Id.

7 Section 8.30(a) of the Model Business Corporation Act was recently
amended. See Committee on Corporate Laws, Changes in the Model
Business CorporationAct Pertaining to the Standards of Conduct and
Standards of Liability for Directors-FinalAdoption, 53 Bus. LAw. 813
(1998) (covering final adoption of certain amendments).

8Strougo, 964 F. Supp. at 795.
9Id.(stating that in Maryland, "two is the minimum number of
directors necessary to form a committee to consider a demand"). In
1996, section 2-41 1(a)(1) was amended to decrease that number to one.
See MD. CODE ANN. CORPS. & ASS'NS

§ 2-411(a)(1) (1998). Judge Sweet

did not give any indication in his initial opinion or in his subsequent
opinion denying reargument and certification that he was aware of this
amendment to section 2-411 (a)(1).
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have demand excused in part due to the directors' service
on the boards of other commonly advised funds. i0
In August 1997, Judge Sweet denied reargument and
further observed that his earlier order had "concluded that
well-compensated service on multiple boards of funds
managed by a single fund advisor can, in some
circumstances, be indistinguishable in all relevant
respects from employment by the fund manager, which
admittedly renders a director interested." ' I The judge also
denied certification of his interlocutory order to the Court
of Appeals of Maryland (the state's highest court) for a
definitive ruling on the issue that all the parties conceded
was solely an issue of Maryland law. 12
The Board of Directors of the Brazil Fund responded to
Strougo's suit by electing an additional director, a visiting
professor at the New York University business school with
a Ph.D. in economics from Harvard and prior experience at
Goldman Sachs, J.P. Morgan and the Federal Reserve
Bank of San Francisco, who did not serve on any other
boards of funds managed by the same investment adviser
and thus was disinterested as a matter of Maryland law,
even under Judge Sweet's ruling. 13 This new director,
together with the one director whom Judge Sweet
previously had identified as disinterested, was appointed
to serve as a special litigation committee of the Fund's
Board to review the allegations of the Strougo complaint. 14
The Fund sought and received a three-month stay of
action in Strougo in order to permit the special litigation
committee to complete its investigation.' 5 However, the
judge ordered that the stay should run from the date the
motion for stay was filed, which meant that the stay
1 Strougo v. Bassini, 1 F. Supp.2d 268 (S.D.N.Y. 1998).
1 Strougo v. Scudder, Stevens & Clark, Inc., No. 96 Civ. 2136(RWS),
1997 WL 473566, *5 (S.D.N.Y. Aug. 18, 1997).
12 Id.

at *8.

13 See generally Strougo v. Padegs, 986 F. Supp.

(S.D.N.Y. 1997) (discussing appointment of new director).
14See

812, 814-15

id.

15See id.at 815-16 (stating that three-month stay was reasonable
"ic]onsidering the complexity and seriousness of the allegations").
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expired on December 15, 1997.16 The special litigation
committee retained the New York City firm of Simpson
Thatcher & Bartlett as independent counsel to the
committee. 17
I. RATIONALE FOR
CORRECTIVE LEGISLATION
Because Maryland has for many years been the
favored jurisdiction for incorporation of mutual funds
throughout the country, Judge Sweet's decisions in May
and August 1997, roiled the investment company
industry.18 As a result, a drafting committee was formed
under the auspices of the Committee on Corporate Laws
(chaired by the author) of the Section of Business Law of
the Maryland State Bar Association. 19 By December 1997,
the drafting committee had concluded that corrective
legislation was necessary for several reasons.
First, the court's holding, if not reversed, would have
created tension between federal law and Maryland law.
The investment company industry is predominantly
groups of funds offering
organized in complexes but managed by the same
objectives
different investment
investment adviser. Complexes generally employ a "pool"
or "cluster" board structure in which the same
independent directors serve on the boards of all or most of
the funds in the complex. These structures permit
1 See id. at 816.

Id. at 814.
18 Mutual funds are open-end investment companies. The Brazil Fund
and the Brazil Equity Fund are closed-end funds. However, the logic, or
lack thereof, of the court's decision applies equally to directors of openend funds as to directors of closed-end funds. Thus, this article is
written without regard for whether the situations described involve
directors of open-end funds, closed-end funds or a combination thereof.
19 Members of the drafting committee included: Larry Scriggins, Jay
Smith and Henry Kahn of Piper & Marbury, LLP; Lee Miller of Venable,
Baetjer and Howard; Dick Phillips and Jeff Maletta of Kirkpatrick &
Lockhart LLP; Henry Hopkins of T. Rowe Price Associates, Inc.; Craig
Tyle of the Investment Company Institute; Will Rheiner and John Ake of
the Philadelphia office of Ballard Spahr Andrews & Ingersoll, LLP; and
the author.
17
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knowledgeable and efficient governance of the funds with
the independent directors' oversight mandated by the
rigorous requirements of the Investment Company Act.
The Act sets forth specific criteria for determining when a
director will be deemed an "interested person" of an
investment company. Service on the boards of multiple
funds with a common investment adviser and the receipt
of "substantial" compensation for this service are not
among these criteria. The Securities and Exchange
Commission (SEC), which administers the Investment
Company Act, has never determined that either service on
multiple boards or the receipt of "substantial"
compensation makes a director an interested person
under the Act. Because approximately 1,600 investment
companies registered under the Investment Company Act
are incorporated in Maryland, it is important that
Maryland law be consistent with federal law.
Second, there has never been any reason to believe
that directors of an investment company or any other
corporation are unable to act independently because they
receive compensation - even "substantial" compensation
- for their service on one or more boards. Directors are
responsible to shareholders, not to the investment adviser
of a fund complex or the management of an ordinary
corporation, and receipt of directors' fees has not been
held to taint the independence of directors of investment
companies or of corporations generally. Indeed, in Kamen
v. Kemper Financial Services, Inc.,20 the United States
Court of Appeals for the Seventh Circuit, applying
Maryland law, held that receipt of directors' fees does not
mean that directors are not independent. 2'
F.2d 458, 460 (7th Cir. 1991).
1d. (rejecting plaintiffs argument that directors' fees meant
directors were under fund's "thumb" because -[i]f allegations of this
kind sufficed, the demand rule would be negated - for almost all
directors receive fees"); see also Grobow v. Perot, 539 A.2d 180, 188
(Del. 1988) (directors' fees, "without more," do not affect directors'
independence); Parnes v. Balley Entertainment Corp., Del. Ch. C.A. No.
15192, slip op. (May 12, 1997) (directors' fees and pensions, without
more, do not imply that directors are not independent or disinterested).
20939
21
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Third, under Judge Sweet's holding, investment
companies organized as Maryland corporations that share
a common investment adviser could be precluded from
having common independent directors. This would greatly
increase the number of persons needed to serve on mutual
fund boards, reducing the overall effectiveness and
increasing
efficiency of these boards and unnecessarily 22
benefit.
resulting
no
with
costs to shareholders
Fourth, many Maryland-incorporated investment
companies operate multiple funds as separate series of
shares of the same corporation, with one board of directors
and one investment adviser, rather than as separate
corporations, each with its own board. No one has ever
objected to this structure as a matter of corporate
governance. If the management of several series can be
directed by one board of directors, there is no reason why
several corporations cannot be capably governed by
common boards.
Finally, under the judge's decision, boards composed
of individuals who serve as directors of more than one
mutual fund within the same complex would be
disqualified from making many determinations affecting
the investment adviser or other affdiates. 2 3 This, in turn,
would subject a board's judgments on numerous issues to
the threat of constant litigation and further undermine
effective governance of these companies. Virtually any
decision presented to the board of directors of an
investment company may have the effect of increasing the
22

Many issues addressed at a board of directors' meeting of one
mutual fund in a complex must also be addressed at the meetings of
other funds in the same complex. If each mutual fund in a complex
must have a separate set of independent directors, the costs of
educating each set of independent directors about the issues for which
it is responsible could be significant and would be paid by shareholders.
23 Disinterested directors of an investment company have responsibility
for oversight of transactions between the investment company and its
affiliates, including affiliates other than the investment adviser. See, e.g.,
Investment Company Act Rule 17a-7, 17 C.F.R. § 270.17a-7 (1998).
Transactions with these other affiliates could als6 be challenged under the
reasoning in the court's decision.
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adviser's fees.
II.

and,

therefore,

27

the

investment

NEW LEGISLATION

Accordingly, the drafting committee developed a onesentence bill, to add section 2-405.3 to the MGCL. The new
bill provided:
A director of a corporation that is an investment
company, as defined in the Investment Company Act
of 1940, who with respect to the investment company
is not an interested person, as defined in that Act,
shall be deemed to be independent and disinterested
when making any determination or taking any action
as a director.
Thus, the proposed new section 2-405.3 tied the
independence and disinterestedness of a director of a
Maryland-incorporated
investment company to the
definition of "interested person" in the Investment
Company Act. 24 No implication was intended that failure to

24

15 U.S.C. § 80a-2(a)(19) (1998). The statute defines "interested

person" as:
(19)

"Interested person" of another person means:

(A) when used with respect to an investment company:
(i)
any affiliated person of such company,
(ii) any member of the immediate family of any natural
person who is an affiliated person of such company,
(iii) any interested person of any investment adviser of or
principal underwriter for such company,
(iv) any person or partner or employee of any person who
at any time since the beginning of the last two
completed fiscal years of such company has acted as
legal counsel for such company,
(v) any broker or dealer registered under the Securities
Exchange Act of 1934 or any affiliated person of such a
broker or dealer, and
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meet the "interested person" standard of that Act would
mean that a director of an investment company
incorporated in Maryland could not be independent or
disinterested.

any natural person whom the Commission by order
shall have determined to be an interested person by
reason of having had, at any time since the beginning
of the last two completed fiscal years of such company,
a material business or professional relationship with
such company or with the principal executive officer of
such company or with any other investment company
having the same investment adviser or principal
underwriter or with the principal executive officer of
such other investment company:
Provided, that no person shall be deemed to be an
interested person of an investment company solely by
reason of: (aa) his being a member of its board of
directors or advisory board or an owner of its
securities, or (bb) his membership in the immediate
family of any person specified in clause (aa) of this
proviso; and
(B) when used with respect to an investment adviser of or
principal underwriter for any investment companyany affiliated person of such investment adviser or
(i)
principal underwriter,
any member of the immediate family of any natural
(ii)
person who is an affiliated person of such investment
adviser or principal underwriter,
(iii) any person who knowingly has any direct or indirect
beneficial interest in, or who is designated as trustee,
executor, or guardian of any legal interest in, any
security issued either by such investment adviser or
principal underwriter or by a controlling person of
such investment adviser or principal underwriter,
(iv) any person or partner or employee of any person who
at any time since the beginning of the last two
completed fiscal years of such investment company
has acted as legal counsel for such investment adviser
or principal underwriter,
any broker or dealer registered under the Securities
(v)
Exchange Act of 1934 or any affiliated person of such a
broker or dealer, and
(vi)
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In early January 1998, the draft bill 25 was submitted
to the Maryland General Assembly's Legislative Reference
Service, which re-organized the proposed section 2-405.3
into two subsections:
(a) This section applies to a corporation that is an
investment company as defined by the Investment
Company Act of 1940.
(b) A director of a corporation who with respect to
the corporation is not an interested person, as defined
by the Investment Company Act of 1940, shall be
deemed to be independent and disinterested when
making any determination or taking any action as
a director.
(vi)

any natural person whom the Commission by order
shall have determined to be an interested person by
reason of having had at any time since the beginning of
the last two completed fiscal years of such investment
company a material business or professional
relationship with such investment adviser or principal
underwriter or with the principal executive officer or
any controlling person of such investment adviser or
principal underwriter.
For the purpose of this paragraph (19), "member of the
immediate family" means any parent, spouse of a
parent, child, spouse of a child, spouse, brother or
sister, and includes step and adoptive relationships.
The Commission may modify or revoke any order
issued under clause (vi) of subparagraph (A) or (B) of
this paragraph whenever it finds that such order is no
longer consistent with the facts. No order issued
pursuant to clause (vi) of subparagraph (A) or (B) of
this paragraph shall become effective until at least
sixty days after the entry thereof, and no such order
shall affect the status of any person for the purposes of
this subchapter or for any other purpose for any period
prior to the effective date of such order.
25 The draft bill was sponsored by Delegate Robert L. Frank (Baltimore
County), who had sponsored many corporate bills for the Maryland
State Bar Association (MSBA) over the first three years of his service in
the House of Delegates of the General Assembly, and Delegate Anne
Marie Doory (Baltimore City). The Council of the Section of Business
Law of the MSBA also approved the bill.
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III. DEVELOPMENTS IN THE MARYLAND HOUSE
OF DELEGATES
A.

INTRODUCTION AND HEARING

On January 30, 1998, this legislation was introduced
in the House of Delegates as House Bill 356 ("H.B. 356" or
the "Bill") and was assigned to the House Economic
Matters Committee. 26 On February 19, 1998, the
Committee held a hearing on the Bill. 27 Henry Hopkins of
T. Rowe Price & Associates, Inc., Bryson Popham,
representing the Maryland Securities Association, and the
author, on behalf of the MSBA, testified at the hearing in
support of the Bill. BT Alex. Brown, Inc. and Legg Mason,
Inc. also sent letters in support. No one appeared in
opposition to the Bill.
After the February 19
proposed 28 providing that
retroactively and shall be
affect only those cases filed

hearing, an amendment was
the Bill "shall be construed
applied to and interpreted to
on or after January 30, 1998."

26 The House Economic Matters Committee was chaired by Delegate
Michael E. Busch (Anne Arundel County).
27 Shortly before the hearing, Dean Mark A. Sargent of Villanova
University School of Law, formerly Chair of the MSBA Committee on
Corporate Laws, sent a letter to the House Committee strongly

criticizing Judge Sweet's decisions and supporting enactment of the
Bill. In pertinent part the letter stated:
Judge Sweet's holding that disinterested directors of commonlyadvised investment companies may not be independent for
purposes of considering an action that may increase the net assets
and, therefore, the asset-based fees of the funds' advisers, is
contrary to federal law on the subject and is unprecedented as a
matter of state law....
In my opinion, Judge Sweet's decision is wrong as a matter of
Maryland law, as its extremely stringent conception of directors'
independence is not based on any Maryland authority. It is also
wrong as a matter of public policy. If not corrected promptly, it
could be applied to an almost limitless number of board decisions,
resulting in either sharply increased costs of administration or an
industry-wide flight from Maryland.
Letter from Mark A. Sargent, Dean of the University of Villanova School
of Law, to The Honorable Michael Busch, Chairman, House Economic
Matters Committee (Feb. 16, 1998) (on file with the ViUanova Journalof
Law and Investment Management).
28 Delegate Michael R. Gordon (Montgomery County), Vice-Chairman
of the House Economic Matters Committee, proposed the amendment.
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The proposed date (the date the Bill was introduced) was a
compromise - it did not affect pending litigation, but it did
close the potential window of opportunity for new suits to
be filed before the customary effective date of October 1 for
Maryland legislation. Proponents of the Bill acquiesced in
the amendment.
B. OPPOSITION
Shortly thereafter, the first opposition to the Bill
30
emerged. 2 9 The first salvo was a one-page document,
which made several fallacious arguments that were often
repeated.
One of the opposition arguments was that H.B. 356
would somehow limit the power of the shareholders of a
Maryland corporation to bring a derivative suit. Nothing in

29 The single opponent to the Bill was a plaintiffs' securities lawyer in
County.
Montgomery
30
See Statement in Opposition to HB 356 (on file with the Villanova
Journal of Law and Investment Management). The document contained
the following points (as stated in the document - underlining replaced
here with italics).
1. House Bill 356 seeks to create a special exception in Maryland law
for investment companies ONLY - not available to any other
Maryland Corporation.
2. The bill is the result of the finding in the Strougo case where
Maryland law was applied and the Court found that there may not
be two "disinterested Directors" (as required by Maryland law) and
therefore did not dismiss the lawsuit brought by stockholders. The
"disinterested" directors in the Strougo case were being paid
$81,000 and $132,000 respectively for service on the Boards of 8
and 14 separate funds managed by Scudder, the investment
company against which the action was brought. The mutual fund
industry did not like the result of Strougo and therefore has
introduced House Bill 356.
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the Bill, of course, eliminated or diminished the right of
shareholders to bring a derivative action. It simply adopted
the standard of the Investment Company Act regarding
who is an "interested person" in a decision by the board of
directors of an investment company incorporated in
Maryland. Shareholders of investment companies retain
the full right to file suits on behalf of investment
companies. Moreover, since 188 1, the Court of Appeals of
Maryland has required that a shareholder who brings a
derivative action must first make demand upon the
corporation to sue in its own name and the demand must
be refused. 3 1 The reason for the demand requirement is
because a derivative suit, in the words of the Court of
Appeals, "is a matter for the corporate authorities
themselves [that is, the board of directors], and not for the
stockholders to determine ....-32 In fact, Maryland
shareholders have substantially greater rights to bring
derivative suits than shareholders in many other states
3. Since 1881, the Court of Appeals of Maryland has permitted
stockholders to bring a derivative action on behalf of the company
if they believe that the Board of Directors has been engaged in selfdealing or breached its fiduciary duties to the corporation.
4. House Bill 356 seeks to prevent stockholders from bringing such
an action directly before the Court if they believe that the Board of
Directors is not "disinterested" and is engaging in self-dealing.
5. The last serious attempt to undermine these rules occurred in the
mid- 1960s. The Court of Appeals of Maryland soundly rejected the
suggestion that the protections of Maryland law be weakened and
stockholders be forbidden from asking a judge to look at their
claims.
6. The Courts in Maryland have not had difficulty applying Maryland
law to mutual funds and other companies. No segment of the
legitimate business community has been hurt by a judge's ability
to consider claims of fraud, waste or mismanagement. There is no
reason to change Maryland law.
7. The Security (sic) and Exchange Commission (SEC) was asked by
the Investment Company Institute to take industry's side in
Strougo but the SEC refused to do so. Only the party that lost in
the case thinks the judge was wrong.
8. HB 356 weakens the State's ability to protect investor's interests
and does not better the mutual fund industry.
31 Booth v. Robinson, 55 Md. 419, 439 (1881).
32
Davis v. Gemmell, 70 Md. 356, 376 (1889).

https://digitalcommons.law.villanova.edu/vjlim/vol1/iss1/1

30

Frankel: Trends in the Regulation of Investment Companies and Investment A

(VOL. 1:21 1999) STRAIGHTENING OUT STROUGO

33

because Maryland retains the futility exception to the
33
demand requirement.
Another opposition argument was that H.B. 356 would
weaken the ability of the State of Maryland to protect the
interests of fund shareholders. This argument overlooked
the fact that protection of investors in funds has4
historically been primarily the responsibility of the SEC,which has never adopted Judge Sweet's position. The
MGCL, however, is the responsibility of the General
Assembly of Maryland. For several decades the Maryland
legislature has adopted reasonable and responsible
legislation concerning the governance of investment
companies formed in Maryland.3 5
33

The futility exception excuses the requirement of demand on the
board before a derivative action is brought. See, e.g., ALl PRINCIPLES OF
CORPORATE GOVERNANCE § 7.03 (1994) (explaining that "[w]hat
constitutes futility varies among jurisdictions"). In Maryland, however,
the exception has been construed very narrowly. For example, in
Kamen, the court held that under Maryland law, "a demand is 'futile'
only if the directors' minds are closed to argument." Kamen, 939 F.2d at
462. Moreover, both The American Law Institute and the Model
Business Corporation Act have eliminated the futility exception and
have adopted a requirement of demand in all cases, subject only to a
limited exception for irreparable harm to the corporation. See ALl
PRINCIPLES OF CORPORATE GOVERNANCE § 7.03 (1994); REVISED MODEL Bus.

CORP. ACT § 7.42 (1998). The Supreme Court of Pennsylvania, in a
recent landmark case, specifically adopted the universal demand rule of
the ALl. Cuker v. Mikalauskas, 692 A.2d 1042, 1049 (Pa. 1997).
34 As noted above, the SEC administers the Investment Company Act.
The Act provides numerous protections for fund shareholders. See, e.g.,
15 U.S.C. §§ 80a-12 & 80a-17 (1998). The Act does not, however,
preclude the application of state corporate law to funds incorporated in
a particular state.
35 One of the early reasons why many investment companies formed
in Maryland was that Maryland law permitted redemption of shares of
common stock. See MD. CODE ANN. CORPS. & ASS'NS § 2- 105(a)(5) (1998).

The Maryland legislature has also enacted many statutes specifically for
investment companies, including unilateral redemption of small
accounts, see id. at § 2-310. 1, exemption from annual meetings, see id.
at § 2-501 (b), and power to make certain charter amendments without
stockholder approval, see id. at § 2-605(a)(4). For further discussion,
see Mark A. Sargent, Maryland's Leadership in the Law of Business
Organizations, MD. B.J. (Jan./Feb. 1997), at 15, 17-18. In addition,
there are many generally applicable features of the MGCL that are
attractive to investment companies, including the absence of any
franchise tax.
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C. PASSAGE BY THE HOUSE
After a favorable report from a specially constituted
work group,3 6 the House Economic Matters Committee
voted on March 24, 1998, to give a favorable report to H.B.
356. 37 Three days later, H.B. 356 was passed by the House
of Delegates by a vote of 83-36. The three dozen votes
against the Bill in the House indicated that there could be
serious opposition to the Bill in the Senate of Maryland.
IV. DEVELOPMENTS IN THE MARYLAND SENATE
A. OPPOSITION ARGUMENTS
In the Senate, the Bill was referred to the Committee
on Judicial Proceedings.3 8 On April 3, 1998, the opponent
sent a letter to the chairman of that committee that was
filled with various incorrect and irrelevant statements. For
example, the letter asserted that the proponents of the Bill
were wrong when they claimed that Judge Sweet's decision
"misstates Maryland law." 39 To support its assertion .the
letter then cited several cases establishing the demand
requirement and the futility exception in derivative
proceedings - issues that were totally beside the point of
Judge Sweet's decision.
The letter also challenged the claim that compensation
for service as a director does not taint a director's
independence by citing several cases involving some form
of compensation or some relationship other than directors'
fees. In addition, the letter miscited an article in The New
3

6 Chairman Busch appointed a "work group," chaired by Delegate
Michael A. Crumlin (Prince George's County), to review H.B. 356 and all
other pending legislation relating to corporations and other forms of
business entities.
37The vote was 16 in favor, three opposed, with one abstention and
one absent.
38The Senate Committee on Judicial Proceedings was chaired by
Senator Walter M. Baker (Cecil County), one of the most senior and
respected
members of the Senate.
3
9Letter from Ronald B. Rubin to The Honorable Walter M. Baker,
Chairman, Senate Judicial Proceedings Committee (April 3, 1998) (on
file with the Villanova Journalof Law and Investment Management).
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Block, 40

for
York Law Journal, co-authored by Dennis J.
the proposition, as stated in the letter, that directors "who
receive substantial payments for these services" are not
"independent."4 1 In fact, Mr. Block in the then-current
edition of his celebrated treatise, The Business Judgment
Rule: Fiduciary Duties of Corporate Directors, specifically
states that demand is not excused merely because directors
"[r]eceive compensation for service as directors .... 42
Most egregiously, however, the letter claimed that H.B.
356 would "insulate the actions of a mutual fund's Board
of Directors from any judicial scrutiny."43 There was no
acknowledgment of the fundamental distinction that the
Bill was not aimed at derivative suits but only at the
the
narrow issue addressed by Judge Sweet disinterestedness of investment company directors who
receive "substantial compensation" for serving on multiple
boards of commonly advised investment companies.
B. HEARING
On April 6, 1998, a hearing regarding H.B. 356 was
44
held before the Senate Judicial Proceedings Committee.
Testimony offered in opposition to the Bill included several
inflammatory and irrelevant comments. 45 It referred to the
"futility demand" cases in Maryland, apparently meaning
40

D.J. Block & J.M. Hoff, Corporate Governance and Independent
Directors, NEW YORK LAW JOURNAL, July 21, 1994, at 5.
41Letter from Ronald B. Rubin to The Honorable Walter M. Baker,
supranote 39.
42

DENNIS J.

BLOCK, ET AL., THE BUSINESS JUDGEMENT RULE: FIDUCIARY

OF CORPORATE DIRECTORS 756, 759 (Supp. 1995).
DUTIES
43

Letter from Ronald B. Rubin to The Honorable Walter M. Baker,
supranote 39.
44Although it is the tradition of the Committee not to invite witnesses
other than the sponsor to testify on bills already passed by the House of
Delegates, Senator Baker asked the author of this article and the
opponent's representative to testify before his Committee on H.B. 356.
45The author testified first, so he did not have an opportunity at the
time to rebut the inaccurate statements made in opposition to the Bill.
The author did submit a letter after the hearing responding to the
erroneous points in that testimony. Letter from James J. Hanks to The
Honorable Walter M. Baker, Chairman, Committee on Judicial
Proceedings (April 8, 1998) (on file with the Villanova Journal of Law
and Investment Manqgement). The discussion of the testimony in
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cases establishing the futility exception to the demand
requirement in derivative suits, none of which were
affected by H.B. 356. It also repeatedly referred to
"stacking of fees" and "stacking of directorships," despite
the fact that Judge Sweet's point in the Strougo case was
not the number of directorships but the amount of
compensation involved. More to the point, the testimony in
opposition not only ignored cases holding that the
compensation paid to directors does not affect their
independence but also noticeably failed to cite a single
case holding that the amount of compensation paid to
46
directors does taint their independence.
The testimony also stated that "Maryland law requires
two disinterested directors" to approve dismissal of a
derivative suit. There is no such law. Perhaps the
testimony was referring to Judge Sweet's reference to the
two-director requirement for members of committees of the
board of directors of Maryland corporations. As noted
above, after the events giving rise to the Strougo case, the
General Assembly, following Delaware and many other
states, amended the MGCL to decrease the minimum
number of directors for board committees from two to
one.

47

C. UNFAVORABLE REPORT, AMENDMENT, ENACTMENT

The Judicial Proceedings Committee on April 9, 1998,
gave an unfavorable report to H.B. 356 by a vote of eight to
three. The fact that two other corporate law bills heard the
same day were also given unfavorable reports suggests
that the unfavorable report of H.B. 356 was based on the
end-of-the-session crush of bills or other considerations
not relating to the merits of the bills.
The proponents of H.B. 356 were discouraged but not
deterred by the unfavorable report in the Senate Judicial
opposition to the Bill is based on the letter from the author to Chairman
Baker, rather than a copy of the testimony.
46 For a discussion of cases holding that the compensation paid to
directors does not affect their independence, see supra note 2 1.
47 See supra note 9.
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Proceedings Committee. 48 During the last few days of the
1998 session, the substance of H.B. 356 was amended
onto another bill, S.B. 468 (which had already passed the
Senate), on the floor of the House of Delegates with the
help of members of the House Economic Matters
Committee. 49 Debate on the House floor was particularly
lively but after a delegate5 ° stood up and announced that
consider
investment companies would
Maryland
reincorporating in other states if S.B. 468 failed, S.B. 468
passed the House by a vote of 113 to 10, giving the
amended S.B. 468 thirty more favorable votes than H.B.
356 on final passage in the House. After passing the
House, the bill was sent back to the Senate, which
concurred with the House amendment to the bill by a vote
of 27 to 19 on April 12, the final day of the 1998 legislative
session. 1
Senate Bill 468 was signed by Governor Parris N.
Glendening on May 12, 1998, as Chapter 397 of the Laws
of Maryland (1998), and became effective on October 1,
1998. On November 3, 1998 most of the Maryland State
Senators and Delegates responsible for straightening out
Strougo were reelected. The sponsor of H.B. 356 was not,
lost in the Democratic
however, on the ballot. He had
52
September.
in
election
primary

48

Strong support for the Bill was provided by George Roche and
Henry Hopkins of T. Rowe Price and Associates, Inc.; Bryson Popham
and John Stierhoff, representing the Maryland Securities Association;
and Paul Tiburzi of Piper & Marbury, aiding the author's efforts in
the MSBA.
representing
49
Chairman Busch and Delegate Crumlin were particularly helpful.
50 Delegate Crumlin.
51 Senator Thomas V. Mike Miller, Jr. (Prince George's County),
President of the Senate, and Chairman Baker aided in passage of the
amended Senate bill.
52 In the quadrennial elections for the General Assembly in November,
1998, Senate President Miller, Senator Baker, Delegate Busch and
Delegate Gordon were easily re-elected. Delegate Crumlin did not run
for re-election. Delegate Frank, the sponsor and tireless worker for H.B.
356, was defeated in the Democratic primary election in September,
1998, by 96 votes.
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V. MEANWHILE, BACK AT THE COURTHOUSE
While the legislative wheels were beginning to turn in
Maryland, on January 7, 1998, defendants in the original
Strougo suit filed a motion to dismiss based on the
recommendation of the two-director special litigation
committee.
On May 27, 1998, the same day that the House of
Delegates gave final approval to H.B. 356, the Court of
Special Appeals of Maryland decided Wittman v. Crooke.53
The court held that the possibility of serving on the board
of directors of an acquiring corporation does not violate the
duties of the directors of the target corporation in
approving a merger with the acquiring corporation. 54
Wittman arose out of the proposed merger between
Baltimore Gas & Electric Company (BG&E) and Potomac
Electric Power Company.5 5 The plaintiff, a shareholder in
BG&E, alleged that the BG&E directors were prohibited
from recommending the merger because each director
might be elected to the board of the successor. 56 The court
held that the possibility that one or more members of the
board of directors of an acquired corporation might be
elected as directors of the acquiring corporation is not
"sufficient to cause the kind of conflict of interest
that
cannot be ratified by the shareholders. ' 57 Likewise, the
adoption of employment contracts for the directors and the
CEO did not create a non-ratifiable conflict.5 8 This ruling of
the Court of Special Appeals strongly reinforced the
position taken by the proponents of H.B. 356.
53 707 A.2d 422 (1998).
54 See id. at 425 ("We reject appellant's argument that the opportunity

for a position on the board of directors of the new corporation is
sufficient to cause the kind of conflict of interest that cannot be ratified

by55the shareholders.").
Id.at 423.
56
Id.at 425.
57

Id.

58 See id. Unfortunately, the court repeated the mistake of earlier

decisions in holding that section 2-419, the interested director statute
of the MGCL, could be "violated." The court also erroneously analyzed
the BG&E directors' duties under the business judgment rule, which
has largely been superseded by section 2-405.1 of the MGCL. See
James J. Hanks, Jr., Maryland Corporation Law § 6.8 (Aspen Law and
Business Supp. 1998).
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On April 6, 1998, the same day as the hearing before
the Senate Committee, Judge Sweet denied the
defendants' motion to dismiss the original Strougo
complaint against the Brazil Fund.5 9 The judge ruled that,
although the issue had not been decided by a Maryland
court, Maryland would apply the standard established by
°
the Supreme Court of Delaware in Zapata v. Maldonado
and (a) impose on the corporation the burden of proving
that the board committee recommending dismissal of a
derivative action was independent, acted in good faith and
had a reasonable basis for its recommendation and (b)
permit the court to apply its own business judgment to the
committee's recommendation. 61 Although Judge Sweet
noted that the Brazil Fund "has met its primafacieburden
of proof with respect to the Zapata standard,- 62 he
permitted further discovery by the plaintiff, including
inspection of the 30 boxes of documents made available to
the special litigation committee, inspection of the notes of
interviews by the committee and drafts of the committee's
report and deposition of the members of the committee just the sort of fishing expedition that the universal
demand rule is designed to avoid.
On that same day, Judge Sweet also denied a motion
to dismiss the derivative action claims in the suit against
the Brazil Equity Fund on the ground that Strougo had
established futility of demand because of the receipt of fees
by
(less in aggregate amount than in Strougo's first action)
63
directors from multiple commonly advised funds.
In late November, 1998, Judge Sweet dismissed the
remaining claims brought by Strougo and his suit against
the Brazil Fund. 64 The dismissal was based on the
determination by the special litigation committee that
continuation of the action was not in the best interests of
59

Strougo v. Padegs, 1 F. Supp.2d 276, 282 (S.D. N.Y. 1998) (stating
that motion to dismiss is denied and additional discovery is permitted).
60430 A.2d 779 (Del. 1981).
61 Strougo v. Padegs, 1 F. Supp.2d 276, 280-281 (S.D.N.Y. 1998).
62
Id. at 282.
63 Strougo v. Bassini, I F. Supp.2d 268, 273-74 (S.D.N.Y. 1998).
4 Strougo v. Padegs, No. 96 Civ.2136(RWS), 1998 WL 805038, *16
(S.D.N.Y. Nov. 18, 1998).
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the Fund or its shareholders. Judge Sweet determined that
both members of the committee were independent and
rejected the argument that bias due to the independent
directors' relationship to the other directors tainted the
committee's independence. The court then found that the
committee had reached its conclusions in good faith,
independently and with a reasonable basis, thus satisfying
the first requirement of the Zapata standard of review.
Applying the second requirement of the Zapata standard
- application by the court of its own business judgment the court found that Strougo's claim that the directors and
the Fund's investment manager had breached their duties
was unlikely to succeed, that there was no proof of
damages to the Fund from the rights offering and that
Strougo's claims did not merit further consideration.
VI. EPILOGUE
On December 4, 1998, Massachusetts Governor Paul
Celluci signed Senate Bill 2079, the Massachusetts
Prudent Investor Act, providing, among other things, that
a trustee of a trust registered under the Investment
Company Act as an investment company with the SEC
who "is not an interested person, as defined in said
Investment Company Act of 1940, shall be deemed to be
independent and disinterested when making any
determination or taking any action as a trustee." 65 The
Massachusetts legislation adopted almost the exact words
of H.B. 356.
Finally, by the Fall of 1998, at least five suits had been
brought against various funds and advisers challenging
the independence of directors serving on multiple boards
of commonly advised mutual funds under the Investment
Company Act itself, rather than under state law. 66

65 1998 Mass. Laws ch. 398, § 2A.
66 Carol Carangelo, Common Boards Targeted at Prudential and
Fidelity, FUND DIREcIONS (Oct. 1998). One of the two co-counsel in all
five suits was the sole opponent to H.B. 356.
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Commentary on a Rare Luddite
Victory - The Templeton Dragon
Proposal
Shareholder
Fund
No-Action Letter
Howard M. Friedman*
Securities and Exchange Commission (SEC) no-action
letters have been described by the United States Court of
Appeals for the Second Circuit as "non-binding statements
of the SEC's intent not to prosecute a potential rule
violation."1 Formally they have no binding effect even on
2
the parties to whom the letter is issued. Nevertheless,
lawyers have come to rely on SEC no-action letters for
3
guidance in interpreting federal securities laws. Several
developments explain the increasing importance of noaction letters. First, on-line services such as LEXIS and
Westlaw have made no-action letters more accessible.
Second, the body of securities case law that is available for
guidance is diminishing as the courts and Congress
narrow private rights of action. Third, more disputes are
resolved through arbitration, resulting in unwritten
opinions. Therefore, the rare no-action letter that appears
more formal SEC pronouncements
to depart radically from
4
deserves attention.
* Professor of Law, University of Toledo College of Law. Professor
Friedman is author of SECURITIES REGULATION IN CYBERSPACE (2d ed.,

1998).
'New York City Employees' Retirement Sys. v. SEC, 45 F.3d 7, 13 (2d
Cir. 1995) (citing Amalgamated Clothing & Textile Workers Union v.
SEC, 15 F.3d 254, 257 (2d Cir. 1994)).
2 See Amalgamated Clothing, 15 F.3d at 257 (noting that SEC noaction letter does not fix any legal relationship between parties).
3 See Thomas P. Lemke, The SEC No-Action Letter Process, 42 Bus.
LAw. 1019 (1987) (noting that no-action process is chief mechanism
"permitting the public and practitioners to obtain the informal views of
the SEC staff on proposed transactions that appear to raise compliance
issues under applicable federal securities laws and the rules
thereunder"); Richard H. Rowe, A SEC Staff "No-Action" Position: An
Impervious Shield Against Liability or a PaperTiger?, 6 INSIGHTS 21 (July
1992).
4 For judicial discussion of another example of a no-action letter that
departed from a formal SEC pronouncement, see New York City
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The June 1998 Templeton DragonFund no-action letter 5
may be unique in departing radically from two separate
lines of formal Commission interpretations without
acknowledging either departure. Particularly since 1995,
the SEC has been in the forefront of those encouraging
innovative uses of Internet technology to disseminate
information to investors.6 In both letter and spirit,
Templeton Dragon Fund reverses course. Moreover, in
1992, the SEC adopted extensive amendments to its proxy
rules
to encourage more communication
among
shareholders who were not actually seeking authority to
vote the shares of others. It did this by deregulating a good
deal of speech among investors who were not themselves
seeking
proxy authority. No
longer was every
communication that related to matters on an upcoming
meeting agenda to be screened in advance by the SEC. The
requirement to speak only through a formal proxy
statement was to be applied more selectively. 7 Templeton
Dragon Fund also repudiates an important application of
these 1992 liberalizations.

Employees' Retirement Sys. v. SEC, 45 F.3d 7 (2d Cir. 1995) (holding

that no-action letter was interpretive, not legislative, and thus not
subject to notice and comment procedures, and was reviewable as
arbitrary or capricious agency action only through a suit against the
issuer).
5Templeton Dragon Fund, Inc., SEC No-Action Letter, 1998 WL
337469 (June 15, 1998) [hereinafter Templeton DragonFund].
6 The two major SEC releases that initiated the SEC's pro-technology
stance were Use of Electronic Media for Delivery Purposes, Securities
Act Release No. 7,233, 1 Fed. Sec. L. Rep. (CCH) 3,200 (Oct. 6, 1995)
and Use of Electronic Media by Broker-Dealers, Transfer Agents and
Investment Advisers for Delivery of Information, Securities Act Release
No. 7,288, 1 Fed. Sec. L. Rep. (CCH)
3,201 (May 9, 1996). See
generally HOWARD M.

FRIEDMAN, SECURITIES REGULATION IN CYBERSPACE

(2d

ed., 1998).
7 See Regulation of Communications Among Shareholders, Exchange
Act Release No. 31,326, [1992 Transfer Binder] Fed. Sec. L. Rep. (CCH)
85,051 (Oct. 16, 1992) (noting that new rules remove "unnecessary
government interference in discussions among shareholders of
corporate performance").
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I. BACKGROUND OF TEMPLETON DRAGON FUND

The SEC's shareholder proposal rule, Rule 14a-8,
embodies finely tuned compromises between the interests
8 If a
of management and those of shareholders.
shareholder who has not solicited its own proxies must
first introduce a proposal that management opposes from
the floor of the shareholders' meeting, the proposal will
surely be defeated. Management will hold sufficient
proxies, with discretionary authority to vote on proposals
raised for the first time at the meeting, to defeat any such
proposal. 9 Even so, it is typically cost-prohibitive for a
small shareholder to solicit its own proxies in order to
obtain passage of a resolution at the shareholders' meeting
of a publicly-held company. Therefore, for many years,
Rule 14a-8 has permitted a shareholder to submit a
proposal to management that the shareholder wishes to
place before fellow investors at the company's annual
meeting, along with a statement in support of the
proposal.' 0 The shareholder proposal and supporting
8 See Securities Exchange Act of 1934 Rule 14a-8, 63 Fed. Reg.
29,118, 29,119 (1998) (to be codified at 17 C.F.R. § 240.14a-8)
(providing new rule for shareholder proposals). For a discussion of the
many factors that are involved, see Proposed Amendments to Rule
14a-8 Under the Securities Exchange Act of 1934 Relating to Proposals
by Security Holders, Exchange Act Release No. 19,135, [1982 Transfer
Binder] Fed. Sec. L. Rep. (CCH) 83,262 (Oct. 14, 1982).
9 Securities Exchange Act of 1934 Rule 14a-4(c), 63 Fed. Reg. 29,118,
29,118 (1998) (to be codified at 17 C.F.R. § 240.14a-4(c)) (permitting
management to obtain in its proxy discretionary authority to vote on
matters that are raised at meeting without advance notice to
management). Even where management has been notified in advance, if
the proponent is not soliciting its own proxies and is not making use of
Rule 14a-8, management may seek discretionary authority so long as it
discloses how it intends to exercise its discretion.
10 The first shareholder proposal rule was adopted in 1942. See Part
240 - GeneralRules and Regulations, Securities Exchange Act of 1934,
7 Fed. Reg. 10,655, 10,656 (Dec. 21, 1942) (formalizing earlier
interpretations of Commission). See Arthur H. Dean, Non-Compliance
With Proxy Regulations: Effect On Ability of CorporationTo Hold Valid
Meeting, 24 CORNELL L.Q. 483, 497-506 (1939) (discussing proxy
regulations relating to shareholder proposals and problems confronting
management). For a history of the rule's development, see IV SECURITIES
REGULATION 1998-2052 (Louis Loss & Joel Seligman, 3d ed. 1990);
Donald E. Schwartz & Elliott J. Weiss, An Assessment of the SEC
ShareholderProposalRule, 65 GEO. L.J. 635, 654-57 (1977) (providing
history of Rule 14a-8).
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statement together may not exceed 500 words.
Management may object to inclusion of the shareholder
proposal and supporting statement in its proxy materials
on several grounds set forth in Rule 14a-8(i). 1 ' In such a
case the SEC staff issues a letter in which the staff either
agrees or disagrees with management's contention that
the shareholder proposal may be excluded. 12
The Templeton Dragon Fund letter involved an attempt
by Newgate LLP, a shareholder in the Fund, to place its
shareholder resolution in Templeton Dragon Fund's proxy
statement. Underlying the letter is a broader movement by
shareholders of closed-end mutual funds to force
management to convert their funds to open-end
investment companies. 13 Closed-end funds often sell at a
discount from their net asset value while the price of open" Securities Exchange Act of 1934 Rule 14a-8(i), 63 Fed. Reg. 29,118,
29,120 (1998) (to be codified at 17 C.F.R. § 240.14a-8(i)). According to
the rule, there are 13 grounds for omitting a shareholder proposal and
supporting statement from the proxy. See id.
12 Under Rule 14a-8, if a shareholder submits a proposal that the
company proposes to exclude, the company must submit its reasons
and a supporting opinion of counsel to the SEC no later than 80
calendar days before it files its definitive proxy statement. See
Securities Exchange Act of 1934 Rule 14a-8(j), 63 Fed. Reg. 29,118,
29,120 (1998) (to be codified at 17 C.F.R. § 240.14a-8(j)). It must at the
same time furnish the shareholder with a copy of its submission. See id.
The shareholder is permitted, but not required, to file a response.
Securities Exchange Act of 1934 Rule 14a-8(k), 63 Fed. Reg. 29,118,
29,120 (1998) (to be codified at 17 C.F.R. § 240.14a-8(k)). After
considering this material, the staff of the SEC will write to the company
either agreeing or disagreeing with its assertion that the proposal may
be excluded. Sometimes the staff takes the position that the proposal
must be included only if the shareholder proponent makes specified
revisions to it. Securities Exchange Act of 1934 Rule 14a-8(m)(3)(i), 63
Fed. Reg. 29,118, 29,121 (1998) (to be codified at 17 C.F.R.
§ 240.14a-8(m)(3)(i)). At the time of the Templeton Dragon Fund noaction letter, similar provisions appeared in Securities Exchange Act of
1934 Rules 14a-8(d)-(e), 17 C.F.R. § 240.14a-8(d)-(e) (1998).
13 See Carol Carangelo, SEC Clears Hurdle for Closed-End Fund
Shareholders,FUND DIRECTIONS, June 1998, at 2; Carole Gould, How a
Closed-End Fund Aims to Tame Its Discount, N.Y. TIMES, June 28, 1998,
§ 3, at 8; Eric Rosenbaum, Mercury Closed-End Fund Lowers OpenEnding Hurdle, FUND ACTION, Aug. 10, 1998, at 1, 12.
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end funds reflects no similar discount. 14 Therefore,
opening a closed-end fund results in an instant increase in
value for existing shareholders. Despite this, managers of
closed-end funds have resisted change, often arguing that
opening the fund would have other negative impacts.
In March 1998, Newgate, which owned over 1.8 million
shares of Templeton Dragon Fund, notified Fund
management that it planned to introduce a resolution at
the 1998 annual meeting recommending that the Fund's
directors take all necessary action to convert from closedend to open-end status. Invoking Rule 14a-8, Newgate
requested that its resolution, along with a supporting
statement, be included in the Fund's proxy statement that
would be sent to shareholders. Newgate attempted to
alleviate the problem posed by the 500 word limitation
through the use of new technology. The supporting
statement began as follows:
We are limited by Federal law to a 500 word
statement. Accordingly, we hope that shareholders
will carefully review the 4 points set forth below.
Additional historical performance data on this Fund
can be accessed 1 5on Newgate's Internet site at
newgateglobal.com

Fund management objected to including the proposal in
the Fund's proxy statement. In particular, it objected to
the reference to Newgate's Internet Web site. Three
separate objections were made. The most straight forward
was that reference to the Web site would subvert "the
intent of the 500 word limit of paragraph (b)( 1)." According
to management, making additional information available
in this way would circumvent "the spirit, if not the letter"
of Rule 14a-8's limitation on the length of shareholder
proposals and accompanying supporting statements.
A second objection focused on the impermanent nature
of information on a Web site. Because Newgate might
14 For discussion of discounts in closed-end funds, see The Internet
Closed-End Fund Investor, A Deeper Look at Discount/Premium(visited
Oct. 22, 1998) <http://www.icefi.com/icefi/tutorial/anal-dis.htm>.
1 Templeton Dragon Fund, supra note 5, at * 1.
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continually change the content of its Web site, it would not
be able to furnish the SEC with a copy of the information
that would be on the site in the future. This meant that
potentially false and misleading information on the site
would not be subject to SEC staff review. In addition,
management asserted, that it would not be able to readily
respond to changing information on Newgate's Web site
without the considerable cost of preparing, filing and
mailing supplemental proxy materials to its shareholders.
This, management argued, "subverts the proxy process." 16
A third objection was that the historical performance
data that Newgate claimed was on its Web site in fact was
not available there and had not been otherwise furnished
to the Fund. This, it was argued, made the reference to
Newgate's Web site misleading.
In a typically cryptic no-action letter, the SEC's Division
of Corporation Finance agreed with the Fund that "[tihere
is support for your view that the reference to Proponent's
internet site in the supporting statement potentially may
violate the proxy process requirements of paragraph (b)(1)
of the Rule" and therefore the reference could be omitted
from the Fund's proxy statement. 17 This language in the
no-action letter left unclear whether the staff agreed with
all, or only some, of the arguments made by the Fund,
since paragraph (b)(1) of Rule 14a-8 was the provision in
the Rule that both limited the length of the shareholder
proposal and supporting statement to 500 words and
required the supporting statement to be furnished to the
issuer at the same time as the shareholder proposal itself
was furnished. 18
16 Templeton DragonFund, supra note 5, at *2.
17 Templeton Dragon Fund, supra note 5, at *7.
18 See Securities Exchange Act of 1934 Rule 14a-8(b)(1), 17 C.F.R.
§ 240.14a-8(b)(1) (1998). On May 28, 1998, Rule 14a-8 was amended.
The 500 word limitation of paragraph (b)(1) now appears in paragraph
(d). See Securities Exchange Act of 1934 Rule 14a-8(d), 63 Fed. Reg.
29,118, 29,119 (1998) (to be codified at 17 C.F.R. § 240.14a-8(d)).
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II. THE USE OF THE INTERNET IN PROXY
SOLICITATIONS
Since 1995, the Internet has become an increasingly
important tool in proxy solicitations. For uncontested
meetings, companies increasingly post their proxy
statements and annual reports to shareholders on their
Web sites, delivering these documents electronically and
9
permitting proxies to be returned via the Internet.1 In
proxy contests, the Internet is beginning to be used as a
supplement to the proxy statement to furnish more
information to interested shareholders. 20 For example, in
their 1996 challenge to the management of RJR Nabisco,
Carl Icahn and Bennett Lebow posted follow-up
information on the Web site of Georgeson & Co., their
professional proxy soliciting firm.2 1 Where dissidents have
already sent out a proxy statement, this kind of additional
soliciting material does not need to be pre-cleared by the
SEC. It must merely be filed with the SEC and the relevant
stock exchanges on the date that it is first made available
22
to shareholders.
Just as a Web site seems an appropriate vehicle for
supplementing dissidents' arguments in a proxy fight, it
seems similarly well suited for supplementing the barebones 500 word (or less) statement in support of a
shareholder's proposal under Rule 14a-8. Indeed, nothing
in the SEC's Templeton Dragon Fund no-action letter
precludes shareholder proponents from placing additional
information on a Web site. The no-action letter merely
prevents the shareholder from calling the Web site to
fellow-shareholders' attention through management's
proxy statement. In reaching that result, the arguments
accepted by the SEC seem surprisingly unpersuasive.
See FRIEDMAN, supra note 6, at ch. 11.
See FRIEDMAN, supra note 6, at ch. 12.
21 See Hal Lux, Internet Becomes Tool In Nabisco Proxy Fight, INV.
DEALERS' DIGEST, Jan. 29, 1996, at 8 (discussing experiment with
19

20

Internet in proxy fight and noting that while "the Web is not likely to be
the deciding factor in [proxy] fight... proxy experts say it is a medium
worth the experiment").
22Securities Exchange Act of 1934 Rule 14a-6(b), 17 C.F.R.
§ 240.14a-6(b) (1998), see FRIEDMAN, supra note 6, § 12.01[b].
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III. WHY THE SEC WAS WRONG
A. 500 WORD LIMITATION

The simplest argument put forward by management was
that the shareholder's Web site violated the 500 word
limitation for shareholder proposals in Rule 14a-8. This
deceptively literal conclusion fails to address the policies
behind Rule 14a-8's 500 word limitation. While the SEC
has not always spelled out the rationale for its longstanding limitation on the length of shareholder proposals
and/or supporting statements, 23 the least persuasive
explanation is that the government has determined that
shareholder proponents should not speak at length. In the
past, when government has attempted usually
unsuccessfully - to restrict the quantity of speech, its
goal has been to equalize the relative ability of competing
sides to reach an audience. 24 That cannot be the SEC's
23 The exact limitation has varied over time. Early versions of Rule
14a-8 contained only a limitation on the length of the supporting
statement. The earliest version (then numbered Rule 14a-7) merely

limited supporting statements to 100 words. See Part 240 - General
Rules and Regulations, Securities Exchange Act of 1934, 7 Fed. Reg.
10,655, 10,656 (Dec. 21, 1942). When that limitation began to be
abused through the use of lengthy "Whereas clauses" in the proposal
which were in fact arguments for adoption of the proposal, the
Commission amended Rule 14a-8 to provide that these clauses would
be counted as part of the supporting statement, but raised the word
limit for the supporting statement to 200 words. See Adoption of
Amendments to Rules 14a-5 and 14a-8 under the Exchange Act,
Exchange Act Release No. 9,784, [1972-1973 Transfer Binder] Fed. Sec.
L. Rep. (CCH) 78,997 (Sept. 22, 1972). In 1976, the Commission
added a separate 300 word limitation for the shareholder proposal
itself. See Adoption of Amendments Relating to Proposals by Security
Holders, Exchange Act Release No. 12,999, 11976-1977 Transfer
Binder] Fed. Sec. L. Rep. (CCH) 80,812 (Nov. 22, 1976) (noting that
300 word limitation was due in part to several proposals that "'exceeded
the bounds of reasonableness"). In 1983, these were combined into a
500 word limit for the proposal and supporting statement together. See
Amendments to Rule 14a-8 Under the Securities Exchange Act of 1934
Relating to Proposals by Security Holders, Exchange Act Release No.
20,091, [1983-1984 Transfer Binder] Fed. Sec. L. Rep. (CCH) 83,417
(Aug.
16, 1983).
24
See Buckley v. Valeo, 424 U.S. 1, 48-49 (1976) (holding that "the
concept that government may restrict the speech of some elements of
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goal here since management has no limits imposed on the
length of the counter-arguments that it places in its proxy
statement. Indeed, the SEC's entire attempt to restore
shareholder democracy has been a battle against the
voicelessness of the small shareholder. Rule 14a-8 was an
attempt to give the small shareholder some power, not to
25
limit his or her voice.
A different rationale is suggested by the administrative
history of Rule 14a-8 and seems more persuasive. In its
1976 amendments to Rule 14a-8 that, for the first time,
imposed length restrictions on the shareholder's
resolution itself, as well as on the supporting statement,
the SEC noted:
[1In recent years several proponents have exceeded the
bounds

of reasonableness

.

.

.

by submitting

proposals that are extreme in their length. Such
practices are inappropriate under Rule 14a-8 not only
because they constitute an unreasonable exercise of
the right to submit proposals at the expense of other
shareholders but also because they tend to obscure
other material matters in the proxy statements of
issuers, thereby reducing the effectiveness of such
26
documents.
Stated more fully, since Rule 14a-8 forces management
to include unwanted material in its proxy statement, Rule
14a-8 is designed to limit the burden and costs imposed
on management and other shareholders. A 500 word
our society in order to enhance the relative voice of others is wholly
foreign to the First Amendment..."); see also First Nat'l Bank of Boston
v. Bellotti, 435 U.S. 765, 789-92 (1978) (same). Cf.Austin v. Michigan
Chamber of Commerce, 494 U.S. 652, 658-60 (1990) (upholding
prohibition on corporate expenditures to support or oppose candidate
on ground that restriction "ensures that expenditures reflect actual
public support for the political ideas espoused by corporations").
25
See Donald E. Schwartz & Elliott J. Weiss, An Assessment of the
SEC Shareholder Proposal Rule, 65 GEO. L.J. 635, 638-48 (1977)
(discussing
costs and benefits of Rule 14a-8).
26
See Adoption of Amendments Relating to Proposals by Security
Holders, Exchange Act Release No. 12,999, [1976-1977 Transfer
Binder] Fed. Sec. L. Rep. (CCH) 80,812, at 87,127 (Nov. 22, 1976).
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statement adds little in printing or postage costs to the
corporation's mailing. On the other hand, permitting an
unlimited amount of material to be included at corporate
expense could create a substantial burden. The length
limitation also avoids deflecting attention from
management's basic message. A very lengthy discussion of
a shareholder proposal might overwhelm other - and to
management, more important - issues discussed in the
proxy statement. By limiting the length of shareholder
proposals, Rule 14a-8 still permits management to focus
the attention of shareholders on the other issues it wishes
to bring to a vote. Neither the goal of avoiding new costs
nor of assuring appropriate focus on other items is
undercut by permitting the shareholder proponent to
include in his or her 500 word statement a reference to a
27
Web site.
B. PRIOR REVIEW

Fund management also argued that the impermanent
nature of information of a Web site would preclude prior
review by the SEC staff of potentially false and misleading
information. The SEC, however, has disclaimed any
interest in being able to review such communications in
advance. In fact, the SEC has put forward a wide range of
initiatives in recent years to lessen its role as censor of
materials sent out to shareholders in connection with
shareholder meetings. In 1992, the SEC adopted major
amendments to its proxy rules that were designed to
eliminate much of the SEC's previous role as censor of
speech relating to upcoming meetings. 28 Proxy statements
27 It might be thought that while the goal of Rule 14a-8 is not to place
an absolute limit on shareholder argumentation, perhaps its goal is to
limit speech unless a shareholder proponent first files a full proxy
statement with the SEC. In that way, the SEC would have the
opportunity to review the accuracy of long arguments. This argument
for prior review is no more persuasive than the argument for prior
review made by Fund management, which is discussed below.
28 See Regulation of Communications Among Shareholders, Exchange
Act Release No. 31,326, 11992 Transfer Binder] Fed. Sec. L. Rep. (CCH)
85,051 (Oct. 16, 1992) (noting that amendments to rules "eliminate
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for routine meetings no longer have to be filed in advance
for SEC review. 29 Management merely needs to file a
definitive copy of the proxy statement when it sends the
proxy statement to shareholders. Even in mergers and
contested elections where proxy statements do need to be
filed in advance, additional soliciting material only needs30
to be filed at the same time that it is sent to shareholders.
Thus no advance review is mandated for material placed
on a Web site after a proxy statement is mailed, even in
proxy contests. In adopting amendments eliminating the
advance filing of most proxy material, the SEC observed:
The Commission believes that the most cost-effective
means to address hyperbole and other claims and
opinions viewed as objectionable is not government
screening of the contentions or resort to the courts.
Rather, the parties should be free to reply to the
statements in a timely and cost-effective manner,
challenging the basis for the claims and countering
with their own views on the subject matter through
3
the dissemination of additional soliciting material. '
More importantly, the 1992 amendments deregulated
much speech relating to upcoming shareholder meetings
where the speaker is not actually soliciting proxy authority
and does not otherwise, because of a substantial interest
in the matter being voted upon, stand to receive a benefit
that will not be shared pro rata by all other holders of the
unnecessary regulatory obstacles"). In explaining the new rules, the
SEC stated, "The amendments adopted today reflect a Commission
determination that the federal proxy rules have created unnecessary
regulatory impediments to communication among shareholders and
others and to the effective use of shareholder voting rights." Id. at
83,355.
29
Securities Exchange Act of 1934 Rule 14a-6(a), 17 C.F.R.
§ 240.14a-6(a) (1998) (providing filing requirements of preliminary
proxy statements).
30
Securities Exchange Act of 1934 Rule 14a-6(b), 17 C.F.R.
§ 240.14a-6(b) (1998).
31 Regulation of Communications Among Shareholders, Exchange Act
Release No. 31,326, [1992 Transfer Binder] Fed. Sec. L. Rep. (CCH)
85,051, at 83,365 (Oct. 16, 1992).
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same class of securities.3 2 In such cases, no proxy
statement needs to be filed or distributed. In its Release
adopting these rules, the SEC stated explicitly that
sponsorship of a Rule 14a-8 shareholder proposal does not
create a substantial interest that would preclude the
proponent from freely communicating with other
shareholders, unless there is something special about the
content of the proposal that creates a substantial interest.
The mere fact of inclusion of the proposal does not create
33
such an interest.
C.

BURDEN OF RESPONSE

A subsidiary part of Templeton management's argument
was that it would not be able to readily respond to changed
information on the shareholder's Web site without costly
preparation, filing and mailing of supplemental proxy
materials to its shareholders. This ignores the fact that
Templeton need not use "snail mail" to respond to
proponent's cyberspace message. A response through
Templeton's own Web site would be speedier, less costly
and probably more effective when management is
countering other Internet-based speech. Anyone with
sufficient computer knowledge to access Newgate's Web
site could in turn easily access Templeton's.

32 Securities Exchange Act of 1934 Rule 14a-2(b)(1),
17 C.F.R.
§ 240.14a-2(b)(1) (1998). The one exception is institutional investors
which are required to file a Notice of Exempt Solicitation pursuant to
Rule 14a-6(g) within three days of sending out material, to guard
against secret solicitation campaigns by large shareholders. See
Regulation of Communications Among Shareholders, Exchange Act
Release No. 31,326, [1992 Transfer Binder] Fed. Sec. L. Rep. (CCH)
85,051,
at 83,359 (Oct. 16, 1992).
33
See Regulation of Communications Among Shareholders, Exchange
Act Release No. 31,326, [1992 Transfer Binder] Fed. Sec. L. Rep. (CCH)
85,051, at 83,361 (Oct. 16, 1992).
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IV. A NARROW BASIS FOR
THE SEC'S DETERMINATION
While the major arguments put forward by Templeton
Dragon Fund management and accepted by the SEC staff
seem unpersuasive, the facts do give the staff an
acceptable narrow ground for its conclusion. Interpreting
the no-action letter in this way may save it from
threatening future innovative approaches to promoting
shareholder democracy. Newgate's supporting statement
submitted for inclusion in the Fund's proxy statement
specifically said that additional historical performance
data on Templeton Dragon Fund was available at
Newgate's Web site. In fact no such information had been
placed on the Web site.
Rule 14a-8 permits management to exclude a
shareholder proposal or supporting statement if its
language is materially false or misleading.a4 This might
well be an acceptable basis for permitting management to
exclude Newgate's supporting statement, or at least for
requiring Newgate to modify its statement to indicate
merely that Newgate planned in the future to post
additional material relating to the shareholder proposal on
its Web page.

V. PROPOSED RULE CHANGES TO FACILITATE
USE OF WEB SITES TO
SUPPLEMENT SHAREHOLDER PROPOSALS
Despite my criticism of the SEC's willingness to permit
the exclusion of Newgate's supporting statement,
management of Templeton Dragon Fund did raise two
objections that call for further examination and that
suggest the need for new rule making.
34

Securities Exchange Act of 1934 Rule 14a-8(i)(3), 63 Fed. Reg.
29,118, 29,120 (1998) (to be codified at 17 C.F.R. § 240.14a-8(i)(3)). At
the time of the Templeton DragonFund no-action letter, these provisions
appeared in Rule 14a-8(c)(3), 17 C.F.R. § 240.14a-8(c)(3) (1998).
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A. REQUIRING MUTUAL HYPERLINKS

Templeton Dragon Fund's management was concerned
about its ability to respond to ever-changing content on
the proponent's Web site. As suggested above, a like-kind
response, that is, one through management's own Web
site, is an inexpensive and effective way to participate in an
ongoing exchange of ideas with a shareholder proponent. A
rule change would facilitate this kind of on-line
interchange.
The SEC has a legitimate interest in making certain that
shareholders have convenient opportunities to consider
arguments on both sides of an issue. Therefore, it should
consider mandating through Rule
14a-8 mutual
hyperlinks between Web pages arguing both sides of an
issue. If proponents set up a Web page to furnish
additional information, they should be required to include
on the page a prominent hyperlink to any management
Web page that has been created to discuss management's
side of the issue. Similarly, any management page
discussing the issue should contain a hyperlink to the
relevant page on the proponent's Web site. 35 Moreover, if
management posts its proxy statement on the World Wide
Web, proponent's textual reference to its Web site should
also be a hypertext link to the site.
Mutual hyperlinks will not only assure that
shareholders have ready access to both sides' arguments,
they will also provide an easy method for each side to
check on whether the other has recently changed the
material on its Web site. Any new rule might go further and
require each side to notify the other by e-mail when it
makes a change to its Web site relating to the shareholder
proposal. This addition, however, is probably unnecessary
since it requires little effort to check the linked Web site
regularly during the period between the mailing of the
proxy statement and the convening of the annual meeting.
35 The SEC should probably consider imposing a similar requirement
when Web sites are used by opposing interests in any type of proxy
solicitation.
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A notification provision would call attention to minor
changes that might go unnoticed through a routine check
of the Web site. However, such a provision might also
invite unnecessary disputes about whether timely notice
was given. The rule mandating mutual hyperlinks needs to
be limited to situations in which one side has notified the
other of the existence of its Web site, and the SEC will need
to stand ready to adjudicate disputes about inclusion of
hyperlinks in the same way that it passes on other
disputes under Rule 14a-8.
One other technical concern arises in implementing
competing Web-based discussions. Under present Rule
14a-6(b),
management (but not the Rule 14a-8
shareholder proponent) is required to file all of its
additional soliciting material with the SEC. 36 This means
that the material on management's Web site, and each
changed version of the material, must be filed at the time it
is first posted on management's server. As EDGAR is
transformed to an Internet based system, 37 this will
become a simple task. With little effort, management can
save its Web page to a file and transmit that to the SEC
electronically just as any other EDGAR document would
be transmitted.
B. PRIOR ON-LINE MSSTATEMENTS
AS A BASIS FOR EXCLUSION
A second legitimate concern raised by Templeton Dragon
Fund management is the added danger of false and
misleading statements being disseminated when a
proponent can constantly change the content of its Web
36

The 1992 amendments eliminated the reciprocal obligation of nonmanagement shareholders who were not actually seeking proxy
authority to file soliciting material with the SEC in order to encourage
free discussion among shareholders of matters on an upcoming
shareholder meeting agenda. See supra notes 24-29 and accompanying
text.
37 For discussion of the conversion of the SEC's Electronic Data
Gathering, Analysis and Retrieval system (EDGAR) to an Internet-based
system, see SEC Awards EDGAR Modernization Contract,30 SEC. REG.
& L. REP. (BNA) 1016 (July 3, 1998); FRIEDMAN, supra note 6, § 15.04.
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site. The danger of misleading argumentation through
constantly changing content is not unique to Web sites.
Telephone calls and individual e-mail communications
during the proxy process pose similar issues. However, the
broader reach of statements on a Web site, and other
widely disseminated on-line messages, creates special
risks of influencing votes through false or exaggerated
claims. Particularly when new content is disseminated
shortly before a shareholders' meeting, there may not be
an effective opportunity for rebuttal. Relegating
management to seeking remedial relief through litigation
under Rule 14a-9 may be an inadequate alternative.
Therefore, I suggest an additional rule change to deal with
the heightened threat of false and misleading information
that is introduced late in the proxy process.
Few shareholder proposals in fact succeed. 38 Often the
goal of proponents is merely to obtain sufficient votes in
favor of their proposal so that it can be resubmitted the
following year. The strong message of such a vote may lead
to successful negotiations or voluntary action by
39
management on the subject matter of the proposal.
Under Rule 14a-8(i)(12), depending on how often the
proposal has been included during the last five years, the
proponent must obtain from 3% to 10% of the votes cast to
include it the following year. An amendment to Rule 14a-8
should provide that an additional basis for excluding a
shareholder proposal is that the proponent, during the
past five years, included materially false or misleading
information relating to a prior shareholder proposal on a
Web site or in other broadly disseminated Internet
communications. In addition to information on the
proponent's Web site, the exclusion would apply to
See Robert Todd Lang et al., ShareholderInitiatives: Proposalsand
Solicitations, 4 SECURITIES LAW TECHNIQUES § 53.06[I][a] (A.A. Sommer,
Jr., ed., 1998) (noting that in 1993, only nine shareholder proposals
passed).
39
See id. § 53.02111[b], at 36-37; § 53.0611][a], at 31-32 (noting that
willingness of management to address shareholder concerns depends
on extent to which management believes shareholder can mobilize
larger number of shareholders for future action).
38
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materially false or misleading information that the
proponent disseminated through such means as group
e-mail messages, Internet bulletin boards or on-line chat
rooms.
Such an additional basis for exclusion will not cast the
SEC in any dramatically different role than it now assumes
in passing on whether management may exclude a
for
basis
one
Currently
proposal.
shareholder
management's exclusion of a proposal is that the proposal
or supporting statement is materially false or misleading
in violation of Rule 14a-9. 40 Also if the shareholder
proponent believes that management's statements in
opposition to the proposal violate rule 14a-9, the SEC's
rule encourages the shareholder to promptly notify the
4
Commission staff. '
VI. CONCLUSION
New technology creates possibilities for improving
disclosure, increasing shareholder protection, promoting
capital formation and furthering shareholder democracy.
Innovative uses of technology require nurturing. Nipping
them in the bud through reflexive literalism or in response
to pleas of corporate management that are not justified in
terms of broader regulatory policy discourages the
experimentation which the SEC has so carefully nourished
since 1995. Hopefully, the Templeton Dragon Fund noaction letter will come to be seen as a too-hasty response
and will in fact lack precedential authority as no-action
letters are supposed to do. Better yet, the Commission
should formally repudiate the narrow and stilted
interpretation of Rule 14a-8 reflected in Templeton Dragon
Fund.

40

Securities Exchange Act of 1934 Rule 14a-8(i)(3), 63 Fed. Reg.
29,118, 29,120 (1998) (to be codified at 17 C.F.R. § 240.14a-8(i)(3)).
41 Securities Exchange Act of 1934 Rule 14a-8(m)(2), 63 Fed. Reg.
29,118, 29,121 (1998) (to be codified at 17 C.F.R. § 240.14a-8(m)(2)).
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The Contribution of the Fund
Profile to Investor Education
James A. Fanto*
I. INTRODUCTION
More so than at any time in this nation's past,
ordinary people are investing, directly or indirectly, in the
capital markets. ' Saving and investing are now important,
everyday tasks for which they are responsible, but for
which they may not be adequately educated. Therefore, the
educational implications of any securities regulation
affecting the ordinary investor must be carefully
considered.
If investor education becomes an important area for
securities regulators generally, it must naturally receive
even more attention from mutual fund 2 regulators. In the
recent past, investments by Americans in mutual funds
have grown exponentially as mutual funds have become
the investment of choice both in retirement and non* Associate Professor of Law and Associate Director, Center for the

Study of International Business Law, Brooklyn Law School. I thank
Dean Joan Wexler and Brooklyn Law School for a summer stipend that
supported my writing of this Article. I would also like to thank Professor
Donald Langevoort and Craig S. Tyle for their review of an earlier draft
of this article.
ISee NEW YORK STOCK EXCHANGE, FACT BOOK FOR THE YEAR 1997 57
(1998) (discussing growth of individual stock ownership in America and
noting that "one adult in every three owns corporate stock directly,
indirectly through a stock mutual fund, or through shares that are held
in a corporate thrift plan or defined contribution pension plan");
Edward Wyatt, Share of Wealth in Stock Holdings Hits 50-Year High,
N.Y. TIMES, Feb. 11, 1998, at Al (citing data of Federal Reserve
indicating that Americans have more assets invested in stock market,
as compared to other assets considered part of household wealth, than
at any time in last 50 years).
2 For simplicity's sake, my reference to mutual funds in this Article is
to what are termed "open-end" management companies that sell
redeemable fund shares. See 15 U.S.C. § 80a-5(a)(1) (1996). As a result
of the Securities and Exchange Commission (SEC or the "Commission")
regulatory initiative discussed below, mutual fund shares may now be
offered in a new document.
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retirement accounts (employer-sponsored or IRAs). 3 This
growth is not surprising, because mutual funds provide
consumers with investment options and access to
professional money managers that would otherwise be
available only to the wealthy. Astute mutual fund investing
can enable an ordinary investor to build the kind of
optimal portfolio that basic finance suggests is critical to
wealth enhancement (that is, a diversified portfolio with an
asset allocation among investments with different risks
that changes over the life cycle). 4 Because of the popularity
of mutual funds for consumer investing, securities
regulators need to consider how mutual fund companies
should educate investors to understand the advantages of
mutual fund investing and the benefits of particular kinds
of funds and fund investment strategies, and to
5
comprehend fund disclosure.
3 See INVESTMENT COMPANY INSTITUTE, 1998 MUTUAL FUND FACT BOOK 1
(1998) (describing growth in total assets in mutual funds from $1.07
trillion in 1990 to $4.5 trillion in 1997). Moreover, the number of
mutual funds has more than doubled since 1990, see id. at 16, and
approximately 16% of the $6.6 trillion of total retirement assets at year-

end 1996 was invested in mutual funds. Id. at 44.
4 See BURTON G. MALKIEL, A RANDOM WALK DowN WALL STREET 400-21
(6th ed. 1996) (providing basic explanation of life-cycle investing with
differing asset allocations depending upon life stage).
5This emphasis on investor education should be no surprise to the
mutual fund industry and its regulators. Designed to serve the small
investor who may invest on his or her own, the industry has always
realized that investors need understandable descriptions of funds and
the benefits of fund investing in order to encourage them to invest
initially in mutual funds and to remain invested in them. Fund
companies have thus experimented with ways of communicating to
investors about issues that could be characterized as educational, such
as the basics of saving and investing. See infra note 25. Similarly,
because its regulated industry markets a product to ordinary investors,
the Division of Investment Management of the SEC has likely been more
sensitive than other divisions to issues of effective communication to
investors and their ability to understand securities disclosure.
The SEC has standardized and simplified mutual fund disclosure
because it recognized that fund investments were mainly designed for
ordinary investors. See, e.g., Registration Form Used by Open-End
Management Investment Companies; Guidelines, Investment Company
Act Release No. 13,436, 48 Fed. Reg. 37,928 (1983) (adopting two-tier
disclosure format for mutual fund registration with prospectus and
Statement of Additional Information); Consolidated Disclosure of
Mutual Fund Expenses, Investment Company Act Release No. 16,244,
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This Article examines the educational implications of a
new mutual fund disclosure format recently approved by
the SEC6 that allows fund companies to market their funds
by a summary document known as a "profile." 7 Both the
profile and significantly revised prospectus disclosure
were part of a larger SEC project to improve overall fund
disclosure and promote "effective communication" to fund
53 Fed. Reg. 3,192 (1988) (adopting uniform fee table in funds);
Advertising by Investment Companies, Investment Company Act
Release No. 16,245, 53 Fed. Reg. 3,868 (1988) (adopting uniform
formula for calculating fund performance); Disclosure of Mutual Fund
Performance and Portfolio Managers, Investment Company Act Release
No. 19,382, 58 Fed. Reg. 19,050 (1993) (adopting uniform presentation
of management's discussion of fund performance); Money Market Fund
Prospectuses, Investment Company Act Release No. 21,216, 60 Fed.
Reg. 38,454 (proposed July 26, 1995) (proposing amendments to
simplify money market-fund disclosure).
6The following discussion admittedly highlights only one aspect of the
educational issue regarding securities regulation, and only this
regulation's effect on education regarding mutual funds, because it
concentrates on education that mutual fund companies provide directly
to investors. Yet many ordinary investors, including investors in mutual
funds, invest through or with the guidance of brokers and/or financial
planners. There may well be a need to place educational responsibilities
on such professionals to reach those investors who have no direct
contact with the fund companies. See, e.g., SECURITIES INDUSTRY
ASSOCIATION, INVESTOR EDUCATION HANDBOOK 6 (Nov. 1996) (encouraging
financial firms to have their employees conduct more education of
investors to respond to such investors' need and desire for education).
Moreover, a more troubling issue is the adequacy (or even accuracy) of
education conducted by "interested" parties, whether fund companies
or brokers, and the possible need for "neutral" (or at least non-financial
industry) education providers. See generally James A. Fanto, We're All
Capitalists Now: The Importance, Nature, Provision and Regulation of
Investor Education, 49 CASE WES. RES. L. REV. (forthcoming 1999)
(discussing how competition in education services, both by for-profit
and nonprofit firms, has produced a standardized educational product
and how financial market regulators generally provide some basic
investor education and oversee market efforts).
7 See New Disclosure Option for Open-End Management Investment
Companies, Securities Act Release No. 7,513, 63 Fed. Reg. 13,968
(1998) [hereinafter, Final Profile Release] (authorizing fund profile that
presents summary of key information about fund): Proposed New
Disclosure Option for Open-End Management Investment Companies,
Securities Act Release No. 7,399, 62 Fed. Reg. 10,943 (proposed Mar.
10, 1997) [hereinafter, Profile Proposal](proposing fund profile).
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investors. 8 The Article argues that the profile initiative, as
part of the larger regulatory undertaking, is educational in
nature primarily because, by focusing investors' attention
on certain basic fund features and their comparability with
those of other funds, 9 the new format in effect invites them
to think about the kind of issues that investor education
identifies as central to optimal investing. That is, requiring
fund companies to put information into a format to which
investors can easily apply saving and investing education
encourages investors to recognize their need for this
education.
This Article initially summarizes briefly the reasons for
the importance of investor education in the United States
and the need for U.S. securities regulators to examine
their consumer-oriented regulations, particularly affecting
mutual funds, from an educational perspective. In this
connection, it refers to the large number of investor
educational products and services developed and provided
by fund companies, nonprofit organizations and even
government regulators. It next identifies the educational
importance of the profile within the overall educational
orientation of the revised fund disclosure initiative.
Finally, it argues that the SEC should now take a further
regulatory step to make explicit the educational
8 In effect, the revisions went to the entire fund registration
statement, the Form N- IA, although key amendments altered the
prospectus part of this statement. See Registration Form Used by OpenEnd Management Investment Companies, Securities Act Release No.
7,512, 63 Fed. Reg. 13,916 (1998) [hereinafter, Final Registration
Release] (stating that amendments are intended to improve fund
prospectus disclosure); Registration Form Used by Open-End
Management Investment Companies, Securities Act Release No. 7,398,
62 Fed. Reg. 10,898 (proposed Mar. 10, 1997) [hereinafter, Registration
Proposal] (same). This disclosure initiative also included a proposal
regulating investment company names. See Investment Company
Names, Investment Company Release No. 22,530, 62 Fed. Reg. 10,955
(proposed Mar. 10, 1997) [hereinafter, Names Proposal]. The SEC has
not yet taken final action on this proposal.
9 See Final Registration Release, supra note 8, at 13,917 (observing
that the two major disclosure initiatives are "intended to: improve fund
disclosure by requiring prospectuses to focus on information central to
investment decisions; provide new disclosure options for investors; and
enhance the comparability of information about funds").
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implications of the profile by allowing, even requiring, fund
companies explicitly to link the profile to their's and
others' educational materials-thus alerting ordinary
investors to the existence and importance of these
materials.
II. THE NEED FOR INVESTOR EDUCATION

The importance of and need for investor education
basically arises because saving and investing have
increasingly become ordinary activities in the United
States (and much of the developed world)' 0 that are as
essential for survival in society as finding lodging and a
job. This situation has emerged in the last two decades
and owes much to the increased use by employers of
defined contribution plans" that place upon the individual
0 In another paper, I examine how investor education is becoming

important in other countries for reasons similar to those explaining its
growing significance in the United States, as outlined below. See James
A. Fanto, Comparative Investor Education, BROOK. L. REV. (forthcoming
1999). See also GROUP OF TEN, THE MACROECONOMIC AND FINANCIAL
IMPLICATIONS OF AGEING POPULATIONS

(Apr. 1998) (discussing effects of

increased longevity and declining fertility on pension systems in
developed countries and possible need for funded, including
individually funded, pensions). One example of the international
significance of this subject is a recent SEC investor education campaign
coordinated with countries in the Western Hemisphere. See Overview:
Get the facts. It's your money. It's your future., (visited Oct. 6, 1998)
<http://www. sec. gov/consumer/cosra/about/facts.htm> (describing
campaign and participation by securities regulators in twenty-one
countries in Western Hemisphere).

" See U.S.

GENERAL ACCOUNTING

OFFICE,

PRIVATE PENSIONS:

MOST

4-9
(GAO/GGD-97- 1, Oct. 3, 1996) (presenting growth statistics for defined
contribution plans); Olivia S. Mitchell, et al., Introduction:Assessing the
EMPLOYERS THAT OFFER PENSIONS USE DEFINED CONTRIBUTION PLANS

Challenges to the Pension System, in POSITIONING PENSIONS FOR THE
1, 2-6 (Michael S. Gordon, et al., eds., 1997)

TWENTY-FIRST CENTURY

(explaining shift to defined contribution plans). In the defined
contribution plan, an individual sets aside a portion of his or her
earnings in an account and may receive an additional contribution to it
from the employer, and he or she must decide how to invest the funds
within a limited number of options provided by the plan. See EMPLOYEE
BENEFIT RESEARCH INSTITUTE,
PROGRAMS 57-59, 70-72 (5th

FUNDAMENTALS

OF

EMPLOYEE

BENEFIT

ed. 1997) (describing different types of
defined contribution plans, including savings or thrift plans, profitsharing plans, money purchase pension plans, employee stock
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employee most of the responsibility for saving and
investing for his or her retirement, at the expense of the
defined benefit retirement programs 12 where an employer
basically
assumes
this
responsibility.
Different
explanations, ranging from the cost of defined benefit
programs to the compatibility of defined contribution
plans with the needs of an increasingly transient
workforce, account for this shift. 13 Whatever one's view of
ownership plans and 401(k) arrangements); see also U.S.
ACCOUNTING OFFICE, PRIVATE PENSIONS: PLAN FEATURES
EMPLOYERS THAT SPONSOR ONLY DEFINED CONTRIBUTION

GENERAL
PROVIDED BY
PLANS 11-18

(GAO/GCD-98-23, Dec. 1, 1997) (describing contribution features of
subset of defined contribution plans). In one well-known type of defined
contribution plan pursuant to Section 401(k) of the Internal Revenue
Code, an employee can defer, on a pre-tax basis, a portion of his or her
compensation as a contribution to an individual retirement account
and receive a matching contribution from an employer (generally, a
percentage of an employee's earnings), at the employer's option. For an
employer to receive certain benefits of such plans (chiefly, a limitation
on its fiduciary liability with respect to the plan), applicable regulations
stipulate that it must offer plan participants at least three investment
alternatives that are each diversified and with different risk/return
features. See generally Gordon P. Goodfellow & Sylvester J. Schieber,
Investment of Assets in Self-Directed Retirement Plans, in POSITIONING
PENSIONS FOR THE TWENTY-FIRST CENTURY 67, 70-71 (Michael S. Gordon, et
al., eds., 1997).

12 See generally EMPLOYEE BENEFIT RESEARCH INSTITUTE, supranote 11,
at 69-70 (explaining that in "defined benefit" plans, employer provides
employee with pension calculated in accordance with set formula,
usually based upon years of service and percentage of pay). Defined
benefit plans use different formulae: some pay a flat-dollar amount for
each eligible year of service; others use a percentage of pay for each
eligible year or a percentage of career-average pay; still others calculate
benefits as a percentage of average pay in the final employment years.

See JOHN H. LANGBEIN & BRUCE A. WOLK, PENSION AND EMPLOYEE BENEFIT

LAw 44 (2d ed. 1995). They are all designed to ensure that an employee
works a set number of years before becoming eligible for (or "vesting" in)
the plan. Although complicated, the vesting rules generally require a
plan to vest an employee fully after either five or seven years of
employment. See EMPLOYEE BENEFIT RESEARCH INSTITUTE, supra note 11,
at 42-43 (noting that once vested, employee's rights generally cannot be
revoked).
13 See Kelly Olsen & Jack VanDerhei, Defined Contribution Plan
Dominance Grows Across Sectors and Employer Sizes, While Mega
Defined Benefit Plans Remain Strong: Where We Are and Where We Are
Going,

EMPLOYEE

BENEFIT

RESEARCH

INSTITUTE

SPECIAL

REPORT

SR-33/ISSUE BRIEF NO. 190, Oct. 1997, at 13-14 (discussing costs of

defined benefit plans, which include not only the actuarial help to
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this transformation, it has clearly begun to focus the
attention of ordinary individuals on saving and investing
(particularly capital market investing) because individual
investors are beginning to realize that their well-being in
retirement will depend upon how much they save now and
how well they invest their retirement funds.
Several other factors make individual saving and
investing an urgent matter. First, for many people
retirement may no longer be a brief period at the end of a
working life, but a time that can extend for years because
of decreases in mortality and that could thus demand
calculate the employer contributions needed to provide the agreed-upon
benefits for retirees, but also the premium paid to a government
retirement insurance fund (the Pension Benefit Guaranty Corporation)
to protect employees of companies that fail to fund their pension
liabilities). See also RICHARD A. IPPOLrrO, PENSION PLANS AND EMPLOYEE
PERFORMANCE: EVIDENCE, ANALYSIS, AND POLICY 85-89 (1997) (arguing that
the decline of defined benefit plans owes much to the popularity of
Section 401(k) plans, which are not so much cheaper for companies to
administer as they enable companies to key retirement benefits to
worker productivity); STEVEN A. SASS, THE PROMISE OF PRIVATE PENSIONS
238-46 (1997) (discussing reorganization of big business and arguing
that defined contribution plans are more suitable in labor environment
where highly-educated employees "rent" their services to many different
companies over their working lives, which means that they could not
take full advantage of defined benefit plans because of vesting
requirements). The negative aspect of this shift is that the defined
benefit plans better protect an individual against the risk that he or she
will outlive his or her retirement resources in the actual retirement and
that he or she will not have the competence to save adequately in
retirement or have the market power to make the best investments. See,
e.g., E. PHILIP DAVIS, PENSION FUNDS: RETIREMENT-INCOME SECURITY, AND
CAPITAL MARKETS: AN INTERNATIONAL PERSPECTIVE 23 (1995). Yet defined
contribution plans avoid any unfairness of the defined benefit plans due
to the latter's redistributive nature and enable an investor to capture
the upside of investment growth and avoid cumbersome eligibility
requirements. See RICHARD DISNEY, CAN WE AFFORD TO GROW OLDER? A
PERSPECTIVE ON THE ECONOMICS OF AGING 111-21 (1996) (explaining that,
in defined benefit plans, older workers benefit at expense of others
because they are given early retirement, which typically requires more
contributions from younger workers); Jeffrey N. Gordon, Employees,
Pensions, and the New Economic Order, 97 COLUM. L. REV. 1519,
1539-40 (1997) (observing that employers providing defined benefit
plans captured most of the 350% gain in pension fund assets from 1980
to 1995 because their pension obligations to employees were fixed).
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considerable resources.14 Second, the main federal
retirement program, Social Security, which is really a
"pay-as-you-go system" where present workers
pay
benefits for current retirees, has potential funding
difficulties and, in any event, cannot support an adequate
retirement for most people. 15 Indeed, many policy
discussions and legislative proposals regarding Social
Security suggest replacing, partly or entirely, its current
defined benefit with a defined contribution approach, that
is, allowing at least some of an individual's contributions
to be placed in an individualized account subject to his or
her own limited investment decision-making, rather than
to be used to pay the Social Security benefits of current
retirees. 16

14See

U.S. GENERAL ACCOUNTING OFFICE, RETIREMENT INCOME:
IMPLICATIONS OF DEMOGRAPHIC TRENDS FOR SOCIAL SECURITY AND PENSION
REFORM 17 (GAO/HEHS-97-81, July 11,
1997) [hereinafter, GAO
RETIREMENT INCOME] (providing chart showing steady longevity increase
since
1940 and projected increase in future).
5

h See generally U.S. GENERAL ACCOUNTING OFFICE, SOCIAL SECURITY:
APPROACHES
FOR ADDRESSING PROGRAM SOLVENCY
12-20

DIFFERENT

(GAO/HEHS-98-33, July 22, 1998) (describing basic structure of
program and funding difficulties caused by lower fertility and increased
longevity of "Baby Boom" generation); GAO RETIREMENT INCOME, supra
note 14, at 40-41; Robert J. Myers, Will Social Security be Therefor Me?,
in SOCIAL SECURITY IN THE

21sT

CENTURY

208, 209-11 (Eric R. Kingson &

James H. Schulz eds., 1997) (summarizing various actuarial reports on
date of future deficit in Social Security funds). In the Social Security
program (officially, the Old-Age, Survivors, and Disability Insurance
(OASDI) program), present workers are taxed to pay for the benefits of
current retirees. See Myers supra, at 208. Social Security now collects
more than it pays out and has generated a surplus that is invested in,
and receives interest payments as, U.S. Treasury securities. Id. at 209.
Under current estimates, Social Security's surplus will rapidly fall in
2009 and disappear in 2012. Id. The federal government will then have
to begin repaying Social Security's loan to it to make up the shortfall.
Proceeds from this loan (also known as the Social Security trust funds)
will6 be used up in 2029. Id.
1 See, e.g., GAO RETIREMENT INCOME, supra note 14, at 29-41 (listing
possible solutions, such as reducing initial benefits, raising retirement
age, reducing cost-of-living adjustments, means-testing benefits,
increasing income taxes on Social Security benefits, increasing payroll
taxes, etc.); U.S. GENERAL ACCOUNTING OFFICE, SOCIAL SECURITY FINANCING:
IMPLICATIONS OF GOVERNMENT STOCK INVESTING FOR THE TRUST FUND, THE

4-6 (GAO/AIMD/HEHS-98-74, Apr.
22,1998) (discussing implications of shifting Social Security trust funds
from investing in government securities to stocks); NATIONAL COMM'N ON
FEDERAL BUDGET, AND THE ECONOMY
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This development may, or may not be, for the best.
Many individuals may not be competent to plan
adequately about an issue that they experience once in
their lives. 1 7 And the literature on individual saving and
investing behavior (and on rationality in general) suggests
that there are many reasons, including psychological
8
factors, why individuals do not save and invest optimally. 1
Placing such an important issue as retirement planning on
individuals' shoulders could lead to significant disparities
in retirement income beyond those that naturally flow
from differences in pre-retirement income, kinds of jobs
9
and the generosity of an employer's pension plans.' Yet,
as I argue elsewhere, 20 individual saving and investing
responsibility will exist in the United States primarily for
cultural reasons. The situation is not bleak, because, more
so than ever in the past, individuals have a wealth of
investment opportunities, primarily because of the
2 1ST CENTURY RETIREMENT SECURnIY PLAN" 2 (May
19, 1998) (summarizing its reform recommendations on Social Security,
which include having individual Social Security accounts with
individually-directed investments).
1 See Richard H. Thaler, Psychology and Savings Policies, 84 AM.
ECON. ASSN. PAPERS & PROC. 186, 187 (May 1994); see also U.S. GENERAL
RETIREMENT POLICY, "THE

ACCOUNTING

OFFICE,

SOCIAL

ADDRESSING PROGRAM SOLVENCY

SECURITY:

DIFFERENT

APPROACHES

FOR

69 (GAO/HEHS-98-33, July 22, 1998)

("Under a privately managed system of individual accounts, individuals
or employers might contract directly with financial institutions. This
could mean a wide array of investment choices for individuals and, at
the same time, a wide variation in potential financial outcomes.").
18See, e.g., Christine Jolls, et al., A BehavioralApproach to Law and
Economics, 50 STAN. L. REV. 1471, 1477-78 (1998) (discussing data
calling into question rationality of economic actors); Cass R. Sunstein,
The FuLture of Law and Economics: Looking Forward: Behavioral
Analysis of Law, 64 U. CHI. L. REv. 1175, 1179-92 (1997) (outlining
psychological factors that can affect rationality), Thaler, supranote 17,
at 186-91 (arguing that psychological factors affect investors so that
they do not perform optimal life-cycle investing). See generally Matthew
Rabin, Psychology and Economics, 36 J. ECON. LIT. 11, 24-31 (Mar.
1998) (discussing evidence of biases in decision-making).
19That is, giving individuals saving and investing responsibility
cannot affect such issues as the enormous disparities in income arising
from kinds of employment. Other things being equal, however, it could
lead to differences in retirement income that depend upon the amount
and one's investment strategy.
saved
20
See Fanto, supranote 6.
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development of mutual funds. The major policy question,
therefore, is how to help ordinary people perform optimally
21
their saving and investing responsibilities.
Investor education, one of the central ways of so
helping ordinary investors, raises many issues, such as
the identity of its provider and the nature of its content.
Because this is not the place to explore these theoretical
questions, 22 it is enough to observe that policy-makers in
fmancial services 23 are clearly focusing on investor
21 One problem with a narrow definition of investor education is that it
encourages investors to concentrate only on their portfolio and to ignore

"larger" social issues relating to company activity. Yet they must
acquire this basic financial education, which is critical to their social

survival, before progressing to education about "larger" corporate and
financial issues. See James A. Fanto, Investor Education, Securities
Disclosure and the Creation and Enforcement of Corporate Governance
and Firm Norms, 48 CATH. U. L. REV. (1998).
221 have outlined a theoretical model for the kinds and appropriate
providers of investor education. See Fanto, supra note 6. Economists,
most notably Douglas Bernheim, have investigated the efficacy of
investor education in different contexts. See, e.g., PATRICK J. BAYER, ET
AL., THE EFFECTS OF FINANCIAL EDUCATION IN THE WORKPLACE: EVIDENCE

(National Bureau of Econ. Research
Working Paper No. 5655, 1996) (discussing evidence from workplace
financial education); B. DOUGLAS BERNHEIM, ET AL., EDUCATION AND
FROM A SURVEY OF EMPLOYERS

SAVING: THE LONG-TERM EFFECTS OF HIGH SCHOOL FINANCIAL CURRICULUM

MANDATES (National Bureau of Econ. Research Working Paper No. 6085,

1997) (presenting empirical research on results of high school financial
education);
DETERMINANTS

B.

DOUGLAS

AND

BERNHEIM

CONSEQUESCES

OF

&

DANIEL

FINANCIAL

WORKPLACE: EVIDENCE FROM A SURVEY OF HOUSEHOLDS

M.

GARRETr,

EDUCATION

IN

THE
THE

(National Bureau of

Econ. Research Working Paper No. 5667, 1996) (presenting empirical
research on effects of workplace financial education).
23 Securities regulators cannot accomplish this task alone. For one
reason, they have no jurisdiction over the individual investing that
occurs through employer-sponsored defined contribution plans, which

the Pension and Welfare Benefits Administration in the Department of
Labor oversees under the statutory structure of the Employee
Retirement Income Security Act of 1974 (ERISA). See 29 U.S.C. § 1104(c)
(West Supp. 1998) (authorizing employer to provide defined
contribution individual account plan); 29 C.F.R. § 2550.404c-1(b)(3)
(1998) (Department of Labor's regulations providing that employer must
offer employee minimum of three diversified investment alternatives
with different risk and return characteristics). The applicable
regulations for such plans require that an employer supply information
about the investment alternatives so that employees can make an
informed decision, see 29 C.F.R. § 2550.404c-(c) (1998), and this

https://digitalcommons.law.villanova.edu/vjlim/vol1/iss1/1

66

Frankel: Trends in the Regulation of Investment Companies and Investment A

(VOL. 1:59 1999) CONTRIBUTION OF THE FUND PROFILE

69

education. A recent amendment to the Employee
Retirement Income Security Act of 1974 (ERISA), for
example, requires pension regulators and associated
financial market regulators to develop saving and
investing education, 2 4 and the SEC has promoted investor
education through the activities of its Office of Investor
Education and Assistance, such as the recent "Facts on
Saving and Investing Campaign." 25 Those in the financial
services industry, and their friends, have not waited for
policy guidance to engage in investor education, but have
created numerous educational products and services in
information can come in the form of disclosure concerning a given

investment prepared in accordance with securities regulations. The aid

given to individual investors must come, therefore, from many sources,
including the government regulator having jurisdiction over the
particular kind of investing in question. See, e.g., Participant
Investment Education, Interpretive Bulletin 96-1, 29 C.F.R. §
2509.96-1(d) (1996) (establishing a "safe harbor" for four kinds of
information and education that employers, and particularly financial
firms operating the plans for them, can supply to employees without
triggering a fiduciary obligation to them (i.e., without being deemed to
be giving investment advice)).
24 See, e.g., Savings Are Vital to Everyone's Retirement Act of 1997 or
SAVER Act, which amended ERISA to provide outreach to promote
retirement income savings and a national summit on retirement
savings. See 29 U.S.C. §§ 1146-47 (West Supp. 1998). The SAVER Act
states that its purpose is:
(1) to advance the public's knowledge and understanding of
retirement savings and its critical importance to the future wellbeing of American workers and their families; (2) to provide for a
periodic, bipartisan national retirement savings summit in
conjunction with the White House to elevate the issue of savings to
national prominence; and (3) to initiate the development of a broadbased, public education program to encourage and enhance
individual commitment to a personal retirement savings strategy.
Savings Are Vital to Everyone's Retirement Act of 1997, Pub. L. No.
§ 2, 111 Stat. 2139, 2139 (1997).
105-92,
25
See Overview: Get the facts. It's your money. It's your future.,
1998) <http://www.sec.gov/consumer/cosra/
(visited Oct. 6,
about/facts.htm> (describing week-long, SEC-sponsored "Facts on
Saving and Investing Campaign" from March 29 to April 4, 1998 with
participation of other government agencies, state securities regulators,
consumer organizations and financial industry trade groups). Most
recently, the SEC has placed a "Financial Facts Toolkit" on its web site.
See Get the facts. It's your money. It's your future. FinancialFacts Tool
Kit, (visited Oct. 6, 1998) <http://www.sec.gov/consumer/toolkit.htm>.
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response to investor demand and, as is most likely, as a
26
way to stimulate this demand.
Federal financial regulators clearly have a role in
investor education. This role involves participating in a
national campaign to help change the norms and behavior
of individuals regarding saving and investing27 and to
26 Sources of investor educational materials and services are simply
too numerous to list. Fund companies, brokers, trade organizations and
nonprofit organizations, among others, provide educational materials
and services through various media, including the World Wide Web.
See, e.g., Fidelity Investments: Know what you own and know why you
own it, (visited Oct. 6, 1998) <http://www.fidelity.com/planning/
investment> (providing investment educational materials about
importance of saving, particularly for retirement needs, elementary
finance, investments, tax-reducing retirement options, mutual funds,
investment basics and asset-allocation strategies); Mutual Fund
Connection, (visited Oct. 6, 1998) <http://www.ici.org> (providing
general educational materials explaining nature of mutual fund, its
risks and benefits (chiefly diversification), kinds of mutual funds,
typical fees, expenses and services of funds and pricing and redemption
of mutual fund shares); AARP Webplace, (visited Oct. 6, 1998)
<http://www.aarp.org> (web site of American Association of Retired
Persons with extensive educational materials); National Institute for
Consumer Education, (visited Oct. 6, 1998) <http://www.emich.edu/
public/coe/nice/nice.html> (including educational materials developed
with assistance of National Association of Securities Dealers, and
hypertext link to free or inexpensive sources of investor education). See
generally, Fanto, supra note 6 (discussing these private educational
materials and services).
27 See Fanto, supra note 6. Federal and state government officials
need to encourage improved saving and investing by ordinary
Americans, so that investing and saving become both optimal and
almost habitual. See Hersh M. Shefrin & Richard H. Thaler, The

BehavioralLife-Cycle Hypothesis, in RICHARD H. THALER, QUASI-RATIONAL
ECONOMICS 91, 92-101 (1991) (describing usefulness of "habitual rules"
in enabling individuals to resist impulses, and explaining prominence of
"mental accounts," whereby individuals divide their income and assets
into various accounts, some of which are unavailable for current
consumption). See generally Assar Lindbeck. Incentives and Social
Norms in Household Behavior, 87 AMER. ECON. REv. 370, 375-76 (1997)
(discussing saving and consumption norms that "provide a third
important illustration of relations between economic incentives and
social norms in the context of household behavior"); Richard H.
McAdams, The Origin, Development, and Regulation of Norms, 96 MICH.
L. REv. 338, 351 (1997) (defining "norms" as nonlegal obligations
arising within decentralized groups or at societal level); Richard A.
Posner, Social Norms and the Law: An Economic Approach, 87 AMER.
ECON. REV. 365, 365 (1997) ("By 'social norm' ('norm' for short) I shall
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educate them on protecting themselves against financial
fraud. As part of this activity, they should also consider
how they could best work with private parties to develop
and deliver investor education.
III. THE EDUCATIONAL IMPORTANCE
OF THE PROFILE
The profile initiative, which essentially involves
allowing mutual fund companies to sell mutual funds by
means of an abbreviated prospectus or profile, raises
significant issues for fund companies and legal
practitioners in investment management. A central one
involves the liability implications of permitting a company
to use an abbreviated document, as opposed to the full
prospectus, to solicit interest in the fund. 28 This Article's
analysis of the profile, however, focuses only on its
implications for investor education. From this perspective,
the profile initiative first exemplifies how investor
education should involve a partnership between private
firms providing, and experimenting with the design of,
educational products and services and government
regulators who oversee and promote this activity. Second,
mean a rule that is neither promulgated by an official source, such as a
court or a legislature, nor enforced by the threat of legal sanctions, yet
is regularly complied with (otherwise it wouldn't be a rule).") (footnote
omitted).
28 The central concern is that a fund company would incur liability by
using a profile, which omits material information about the fund that
the full prospectus otherwise includes. The company could not rely on
the full prospectus in using the profile, because the profile does not
incorporate by reference the longer document. Although the profile is a
summary or "omitting" prospectus under Section 10(b) of the Securities
Act of 1933 that is exempt from the strict liability of Section 11 of the
Act, see 15 U.S.C. § 77j(b) (1996), a company could incur liability for the
profile under Section 12(a)(2) of that Act or generally under Section
10(b) and Rule lOb-5 of the Securities Exchange Act. See generally
Final Profile Release, supra note 7, at 13,970-13,972 (discussing
liability issues concerning profile); Profile Proposal, supra note 7, at
10,950 (same). The SEC believes that fund companies should not incur
increased liability for using a profile so long as a profile provides
material information (or does not omit such information) required by
the line items of the profile format. See Final Profile Release, supra note
7, at 13,971-13,972.
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the initiative shows, as a general matter, the increasing
link between securities disclosure and education because
of the renewed focus in securities regulation on effective
communication to the ordinary investor. Third and more
specifically, by raising key topics that should be on every
investor's mind, a profile presupposes on an investor's
part some investor training and invites the investor to
apply an educational framework to it.
The development of the profile exemplifies how the
private sector (a term used broadly to include both "for
profit" and nonprofit companies) has often taken the lead
in providing investor educational products and services to
the ordinary investor. Closer to the consumer than
government regulators and responding to the needs of
their customers, private firms pay attention to the
increased saving and investing responsibilities of ordinary
people and their confusion in the face of numerous
investment products and services. In particular, mutual
fund companies are well situated to observe that the
typical investor, whether inside or outside retirement
plans, "face[s] an increasingly difficult task in choosing
among different fund investments" 29 and has limited
financial sophistication or "literacy." 30 They also realize
that, because many of these investors cannot understand,
and/or do not have the time to read, the lengthy,
financially and legally complex fund prospectuses, 31 they
increasingly look to simple comparisons, evaluations and
See Final Profile Release, supra note 7, at 13,968 (noting that "It]he
Commission, fund investors, and others have recognized the need to
improve fund disclosure documents to help investors evaluate and
29

compare
funds.") (footnote omitted).
30

See id. (discussing different types of investors). See generally, Henry
T. C. Hu, Illiteracy and Intervention: Wholesale Derivatives, Retail
Mutual Funds, and the Matter of Asset Class, 84 GEO. L.J. 2319,
2358-79 (1996) (observing that mutual fund disclosure laws
increasingly require discussion of attributes of class of investments to
which fund belongs (or in which it invests) and thus leads to issues of
investor "literacy").
31 See Final Profile Release, supranote 7, at 13,970 ("The Commission
and others, in seeking to identify ways to improve the disclosure of
information about mutual funds to investors, have collected data about
investors. This data demonstrates that different investors desire and
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ratings of funds offered by market services 32 or to the more
accessible materials supplementary to a prospectus, such
as sales literature and advertisements, supplied by fund
companies, to make an investment decision. 33 Accordingly,
in consultation with the SEC and the Investment
Companies Committee of the North American Securities
Administrators Association, the Investment Company
Institute (ICI) and eight fund companies developed
prototype shorter prospectuses or profiles and tested
consumer reaction to them. The tests showed that the
shorter documents were popular with consumers and that
led to the profile initiative. 4
The initiative also demonstrates that a primary focus
of securities regulation pertaining to consumer issues is
increasingly educational in nature because of an
"effective
disclosure's
for
concern
enhanced
communication" to ordinary investors. 35 If the inquiry is
whether disclosure is in fact reaching the ordinary
use different types and amounts of materials in determining whether to
invest in funds.") (footnote omitted).
32 See, e.g., The Kaufmann Fund: Morningstar.net, (visited Oct. 6,
1998) <http://www.momingstar.net> (web site of one well-known
mutual fund rating service).
33 See, e.g., Clifford E. Kirsch, et al., Mutual Fund and Variable
Insurance Products PerformanceAdvertising, 50 Bus. LAw. 925, 933-35,
952-59 (1995) (summarizing advertising laws and regulations and
discussing problems with simplified fund prospectuses and fund
advertising); Paul S. Stevens & Craig S. Tyle, Mutual Funds, Investment
Advisers, and the National Securities Markets Improvement Act, 52 Bus.
LAW. 419, 425-27, 459-68 (1997) (discussing development of simplified
fund disclosure and advertising).
3 See Profile Proposal, supra note 7, at 10,944 (describing history of
experimentation with profiles by large fund companies); Final
Registration Release, supra note 8, at 13,918 (same). See generally
INVESTMENT COMPANY INSTITUTE, THE PROFILE PROSPECTUS: AN ASSESSMENT

BY MUTUAL FUND SHAREHOLDERS (1996) (presenting research into
consumer attitudes regarding fund profiles to the SEC).
3 See, e.g., Final Registration Release, supra note 8, at 13,917
(' Taken together, these initiatives [new fund prospectus format, profile,
etc.] are designed to promote more effective communication of
information about funds to investors without reducing the amount of
information provided to investors. The Proposed Amendments reflected
the Commission's strong belief that the primary purpose of the
disclosure in a fund's prospectus is to help an investor make a decision
about investing in the fund.") (footnote omitted).
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investor, one must improve both ends of the
communication process, the disclosure itself and the
comprehension abilities of the investor. The recent focus
on the ordinary investor has been a priority of the current
SEC Chairman, Arthur Levitt, who has championed such
investors in many initiatives, most notably in the "plain
English" regulation. 36 This emphasis (for it is only that) in
securities regulation is necessary as so many new
investors enter the securities markets and as the
possibilities for their individual investing, through the
World Wide Web or otherwise, multiply. 37 Even if their

expertise traditionally has lain with regulating company
disclosure, securities regulators cannot ignore the
comprehension of individual investors, for, if it proves to
be inadequate, there could be adverse consequences in the
38
securities markets.
36

Chairman Levitt has clearly been the catalyst for the SEC's
educational initiatives: in 1993 he established an Office of Investor
Education and Assistance and has conducted town meetings with
ordinary investors. See Permanent Subcomm. On Investigations of the

Senate Comm. On Government Affairs, 105th Cong., 1st Sess. 18 (1997)
(statement of Arthur Levitt, Chairman, U.S. Securities and Exchange
Comm'n) (describing town meetings as "typically well-attended (often
over 1,000 investors attended each meeting) and featur[ing] a series of
seminars for investors on a wide variety of topics"). On the SEC "plain
English" initiative, see Plain English Disclosure, Securities Act Release
No. 7,497, 63 Fed. Reg. 6370 (1998) (establishing "plain English" rules
and principles for writing prospectus disclosure); Plain English
Disclosure, Securities Act Release No. 7,380, 62 Fed. Reg. 3152,
3155-59 (proposed Jan. 21, 1997) (discussing elements of plain English
in proposed rule). See generally Fanto, supra note 6.
37 See, e.g., Peter Galuszka, Guess Who's Courting the Beardstown
Ladies?, Bus. WK., Sept. 22, 1997, at 90 (discussing direct investment
movement and National Association of Investors Corporation which
encourages this movement and educates investors): Barbara Hetzer,
Direct Stock Buying: A Load of New No-Loads, Bus. WK., June 16, 1997,
at 152 (explaining that individual investors have increasing
opportunities to buy stock directly from public companies and thus
bypass brokers).
38
Cf.,

FRANKLIN

R. EDWARDS,

THE

NEW

FINANCE:

REGULATION

AND

123-24 (1996) (describing concern that investors
could panic in market downturns and upset market structure). Of
course, during the high market volatility of recent months, all eyes have
rested on ordinary investors to see whether, in fact, they will panic and
bring about a market crash as some commentators have speculated.
FINANCIAL STABILrY
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In its profile releases, the SEC affirms that the central
purpose of the profile is to ensure that funds are
3 9 The
communicating effectively to ordinary investors.
profile initiative compels companies to present essential
information about themselves in a simple way so that an
investor who has little time and, even more importantly,
40
little investment sophistication can understand it. The
profile does this in an obvious way by encouraging fund
companies to use attractive graphic presentations and
charts, to avoid dense textual descriptions and thus to
41
make the profile an inviting document to read. A fund
can provide in the profile only nine items of information in
a set order (and several of these involve a chart or table
presentation)42 so that an ordinary investor receives only
limited, key information about a fund in a simplified
format. The final release invites fund companies to
experiment with presentation devices (such as, questionand-answer format) that will further enhance the
comprehensibility of these items. 43 Part of effective
communication involves access to profiles, and a fund
company can distribute them to consumers widely
39 See Final Profile Release, supranote 7, at 13,970 ("the Commission
encourages all funds that decide to use profiles to take the steps
necessary to ensure that their prospectuses effectively communicate
information to investors").
40
See id. ('The Commission's strongly held belief is that the principal
goal of fund disclosure, whether it takes the form of a long or short
document, should be to provide investors with useful and relevant
information.").
41See id. at 13,985. A fund company must prepare a profile using the
"plain English" writing principles, as now incorporated at 17 C.F.R.
§421(d) (1998). See Final Profile Release, supra note 7, at
13,969-13,970, 13,972.
42 See Final Profile Release, supranote 7, at 13,972.
43 In the rule proposal, the SEC would have required that a fund
present the items in a question-and-answer format that was popular
with consumers in focus groups who were the subjects of
experimentation with the profile. See Profile Proposal, supra note 7, at
10,945 (' The proposed question-and-answer format, frequently used by
many funds, is intended to help communicate the required information
effectively."). To allow for continued industry developments with profile
presentation, the SEC omitted this requirement from the final release,
but kept the requirement that the nine items be presented in a set
order. See Final Profile Release, supra note 7, at 13,972.
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through various media, including through mass mailing,
newspapers and electronic delivery. 44 In fact, the SEC
recognizes the suitability of the profile to the growing
Internet use by fund companies and fund customers
because a company can electronically provide a profile and
then "hypertext link" it to the full prospectus and other
45
information about the fund.
The most important aspect of the profile initiative is the
way it encourages an investor to use whatever investor
education he or she has received. The central purpose of
investor education is to teach an investor the basics of
finance and investing so that he or she becomes part of the
investment "culture." 46 This means that an investor must

learn about the basic kinds of investments (including
about the securities markets in which they trade and the
regulation of those markets) and investment professionals.
An investor must also learn to locate information about
investment performance (and acquire the ability to
understand the conventions of presentation of this
information). 47 Even more importantly, he or she must
learn the relation of risk to return, the means of
minimizing or eliminating certain risks (such as, through
diversification) and some fundamentals about investing
44 See id. at 13,981.
45 See Profile Proposal, supra note 7, at 10,951 n.94 (noting that

profile is especially effective in Internet dissemination because of ability
to hyperlink to prospectus from profile). See also Final Profile Release,
supra note 7, at 13,980-13,981. On electronic delivery of disclosure
documents, see generally HOWARD M. FRIEDMAN, SECURITIES REGULATION
IN CYBERSPACE 2-1 to 3-42 (2nd ed., 1998). The profile initiative also
permits fund companies to tailor profiles used in employer-sponsored
retirement plans (such as those under Section 401(k)) to the plan's
needs and participant investment limitations. See Final Profile
Proposal, supra note 7, at 13,981-13,982 (permitting omission of
information relating to purchases and sales of fund shares, fund
distributions and tax consequences).
46 See Fanto, supra note 6.
47
An example of this "standardized" investing education is in
NATIONAL INSTITUTE FOR CONSUMER EDUCATION, THE BASICS OF INVESTING: A

GUIDE FOR EDUCATORS, at Unit 2 ("How Financial Markets Work: Lesson

1-Types of Financial Markets"), Unit 3 ("Investment Choices: Lesson
2-Types of Savings and Investments") (1997) (also available at
<http://www.emich.edu>).
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strategy. In order to create an optimal portfolio, an
investor needs to know how to make a correct asset
allocation in line with his or her life stage and investment
goals (that is, life-cycle investing) and the way to choose
among comparable investments, taking into4 saccount such
factors as expenses and tax consequences.

The profile's content, which uses disclosure items from
the revised fund prospectus, 49 gives investors the above
kinds of information. A fund profile must summarize the
fund's basic investment objectives and the general
strategies of its advisor for achieving them, such as, that
an equity fund adopts a "growth" approach and that it
attains this objective through purchases of securities of
companies with specific characteristics.50 With such an
identification, an investor can consider whether an
investment in a fund is appropriate in light of his or her
portfolio objectives. A profile's risk disclosure requires a
fund to identify in general terms the specific risks to which
it is subject because of its portfolio, objectives and
strategies, as well as to provide a bar chart of annual total
returns over a ten-year period and a table indicating the
fund's average annual returns for one-, five- and ten-year
intervals.5 1 Such disclosure encourages an ordinary
See Fanto, supra note 6.
The profile would alert investors that they could obtain from the
company a full prospectus (which, in any event, would be sent to them
upon confirmation of purchase). See Final Profile Release, supranote 7,
at 13,969. See also Profile Proposal, supra note 7, at 10,944 ('The
profile would allow investors to choose the amount and format of
information they want before making an investment decision.").
5
°See Registration Proposal, supra note 8, at 10,910 ("The
information might describe, for example, whether an equity fund
emphasizes value or growth, or blends the two approaches, or whether
the fund invests in stocks based on a 'top-down' analysis of economic
trends or a 'bottom-up' analysis that focuses on the financial condition
and competitiveness of individual companies."); at 10,902 (requiring
fund to disclose whether it intends to concentrate on particular kinds of
securities and/or on industry or group of industries). See also Final
Registration Release supra note 8, at 13,920.
51 See Final Registration Release, supra note 8, at 13,919,
13,948-13,949; Registration Proposal, supra note 8, at 10,903. A fund
must also present the best and worst returns for a quarter during this
ten-year period so as to indicate the extreme range of volatility in a
48

49
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investor to think about the relationship between risk and
return in a fund (that is, that a greater return comes with
greater volatility) and the appropriateness of such an
investment given his or her risk profile. A fund must also
provide disclosure relating to the kinds and amounts of
mutual fund fees (a subject attracting increasing
regulatory attention 52), which includes a standardized
example showing the accumulated costs of a fund for one-,
three-, five- and ten-year intervals. 53 This presentation
allows investors to compare funds on the important issue
of their costs, as well as their performance. 54
Indeed, the prominence that educationally important
information receives in a profile can almost cause a fund to
conduct some investor education itself. In discussing a
fund's risks, a fund may, but is not required to, identify
the kind of investor for which it is suitable, depending
upon the investor's risk tolerance and preferences. 5 5 A
fund. See Final Profile Release, supra note 7, at 13,977; see also
Registration Proposal, supra note 8, at 10,911 & n. 136 (explaining that
fund companies disagreed about appropriate quantitative risk
measurement standards and about the ability of consumers to
understand and to use effectively quantitative risk measurement, which
led the SEC not to impose any such risk disclosure requirements). This
Article does not discuss the technicalities of retum/risk presentation
(e.g.,
for funds with a shorter than ten-year life).
52
See, e.g., Arthur Levitt, Remarks at the Investment Company
Institute 3-4 (May 15, 1998), available at <http://www.sec.
gov/news/speeches/spch2l2.txt>;
Pension and Welfare Benefit
Administration,
Study
of
401
(k)
Plan
Fees
and Expenses (Apr.13, 1998).
53
See Final Registration Release, supranote 8, at 13,949-13,95 1.
54 The other profile items involve disclosure relating to (i) a fund's
investment adviser, (ii) the purchase of fund shares, (iii) the sale of fund
shares, (iv) fund distributions and their taxation and (v) other fund
services. See Final Profile Release, supra note 7, at 13,986.
55
See Final Profile Release, supra note 7, at 13,975-13,976; Final
Registration Release, supra note 8, at 13,921. The original proposal
required that funds identify appropriate investors. See Registration
Proposal, supra note 8, at 10,903 (providing that risk section would
include disclosure of types of investors for whom the fund may be
appropriate). In response to opposition by commenters who thought
that the requirement would conflict with suitability rules imposed on
brokers and investment professionals (Le., that brokers must determine
whether an investment is suitable for a client), the SEC made
identification optional in the new registration form and profile (although
it encouraged funds to make the identification).
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fund company cannot do this disclosure properly without
educating an investor about asset-allocation and life-cycle
decision-making. A growth fund may explain that its
"ideal" investor has a long-term investment horizon and no
immediate need for funds and may additionally point out
that this investor is typically a younger person with years
of future earning potential who has no near-term need of
funds from investment return (echoing life-cycle asset
allocation that would tell such a person to weight his or
her portfolio heavily toward growth stocks). A risk
disclosure requirement that a fund's bar chart of
risk/return information compare the fund's annual
returns for one-, five- and ten-year intervals to those of an
appropriate market index encourages5 6 investors to
compare a fund's performance to that of other funds and
particularly to a market index. If a particular fund is
actively managed, this comparison, together with the
cumulative cost disclosure, invites an investor to consider
whether investing in the fund would be better or worse
57
than following a passive indexing investing strategy.
56 See Final Registration Release, supra note 8, at 13,922-13,924.
57 See, e.g., MALKIEL, supra note 4, at 422-32 (describing benefits of

index strategy); at 441-46 (addressing why some money managers
consistently outperform market indices). The SEC proposal regarding
investment company names may have even a more basic educational
effect when used in conjunction with the profile because it will protect
an investor's application of educational principles to fund investing.
This proposal, promulgated pursuant to the National Securities
Markets Improvement Act of 1996, which amended Section 35(d) of the
Investment Company Act of 1940 to empower the SEC to address
deceptive or misleading company names by its rule-making authority,
see National Securities Markets Improvement Act of 1996, Pub. L.
No. 104-290, § 208, 110 Stat. 3416, 3432 (1996), would require that a
fund invest at least 80% of its assets in a specific kind or kinds of
securities if its name suggests a fund focus on them (the SEC currently
takes the position that a fund invest 65% of its assets in securities of
the kind indicated by the fund's name). See Names Proposal, supranote
8, at 10,956. In the proposal, the SEC explains that consumers
increasingly use investment companies to meet their retirement and
other investment needs and base their fund investments on assetallocation theory-a primary component of investor education. See id.
at 10,956-10,957. In allocating their money, they use well-defined
kinds of funds, such as stock, bond and money market funds, to meet
their target portfolio composition. Yet, in the SEC's view, investors rely
too much on fund names. See id. at 10,956. Therefore, if a mutual fund
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IV. FURTHER EDUCATIONAL POSSIBILITIES
FOR THE PROFILE
The investor education features of the profile initiative
help ordinary investors, particularly regarding mutual
fund investing. Yet the SEC should expand this initiative,
partly by having funds encourage investors, by means of
profile items, to pay more attention to the basics of
investing. More importantly, the SEC should allow, and
even consider requiring, fund companies expressly to link
profiles to educational materials developed by them, or by
industry or nonprofit organizations. This link will further
stimulate an investor to consider, and to integrate into his
or her decision-making, the important educational issues
so essential to optimal investing. To do this, the SEC must
explicitly recognize (as it is starting to do) the importance
and value of educational products and services of private
organizations.
With an appropriate change to the rule governing the
profile, a mutual fund company could conduct more
education in the profile itself (or in the fund prospectus).
For example, a fund company could explain how a
particular fund would fit into an asset-allocation strategy
and what, in fact, this strategy means. Although a possible
problem with this approach is that it forces a company to
spend too much time hypothesizing about the identity of
the typical investor and his or her need for information and
education, the current regulatory solution in fund
disclosure, which is sensible, is to design disclosure for an
investor who has little training or sophistication in
investing.5 8 The main difficulty with putting education in
the profile is that it would threaten to expand the profile,
and even a full prospectus, beyond its intended scope. The
profile is designed to be a short document (or "virtual"
implies through its name that it specializes in particular investments,
but does not in fact do so, it undermines the beneficial effects of
investor education.
58See Final Registration Release, supra note 8, at 13,919 ("Funds
should limit disclosure in prospectuses generally to information that is
necessary for an average or typical investor to make an investment
decision.").
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document) that provides only the basic information (that
is, the nine items stipulated by the profile rule) that an
investor needs to make an investment decision, which
involves comparing funds on performance and costs. The
profile must, therefore, be kept short because investors are
reluctant to read a lengthy document (as the Names
Proposal implies, they often read only the name of a
fund!) .9
The SEC could, however, enhance the educational focus
or compatibility with investor education of some profile
disclosure items. A good example, as discussed above, is
that a fund indicate the kind of investor for which it is
appropriate. This reference, which need not be long, can
convey the information to which an investor could apply
the basic asset-allocation, life-cycle strategy that he or she
should have learned in an investor education program, or
at least alert an investor to find out about this strategy.
Indeed, profiles presenting a family of funds for different
stages in a life cycle would be particularly useful places to
include this discussion because they could key funds to
different kinds of investors. 60 In allowing fund companies
to present multiple funds in a profile, the SEC thus
enables the presentation of information that truly invites
the investor to apply the life-cycle perspective. 6 1 Even
without an explicit SEC requirement (and without
59

See Names Proposal, supra note 8, at 10,956 ("Congress reaffirmed
its concern that investors may focus on an investment company's name
to determine the company's investments and risks ... ".
6 There is, for example, Vanguard's LifeStrategy Portfolios, designed
for different life-cycle stages. See THE VANGUARD GROUP, VANGUARD
LIFESTRATEGY PORTFOLIOS: ANNUAL REPORT (Dec. 31, 1997). Such
educational aid might not be of use to everybody and would hardly
substitute for a broker or financial planner who could assess an
individual's total financial position and recommend appropriate
investments to create an optimal portfolio. If, however, an investor is
following a simple life-cycle asset-allocation model and has few
investment assets other than his or her portfolio, it would be of use to
him or her to know where a fund would fit into a typical portfolio.
61See Final Profile Release, supra note 7, at 13,973 ('The Commission
believes that the ability to describe different investment options in one
summary document will enable funds to develop profiles that help
investors compare investment alternatives offered by a fund group.").
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undermining broker suitability requirements), 62 it makes
sense for fund companies to give some indication to
prospective buyers about who is a suitable investor for a
particular fund.
A fund company should not have to do more investor
education in the profile itself, other than what is suggested
above, because the company is likely already providing
such education, directly or indirectly through an
organization like the ICI, outside the profile. It would thus
be unnecessary to require a fund company to repeat its
educational product in each of its profiles. Yet this
coexistence of educational services with the profile (and, in
the case of products available on a fund's web site, the
"virtual" proximity of these services to the profile) 63 points
to the most significant improvement to the profile initiative
that the SEC could make by further amendment to its new
profile rule. The profile format invites an ordinary investor
to apply a basic investing education to the standardized
fund information; the fund company has extensive
materials and services providing this education. The
obvious need is to link the two together.
The SEC should thus take the additional regulatory step
of allowing-perhaps even requiring-a mutual fund to
link the profile to investor education materials supplied by
the fund or by some other financial intermediary or
organization. By connecting a profile to educational
materials, a fund company would drive home to an
ordinary investor that he or she needs the education to
make more sense of the simplified fund information and to
invest optimally. In fact, linkage between the information
and education would work particularly well electronically,
which is how many ordinary individuals are increasingly
See generally NORMAN S. POSER, BROKER-DEALER LAW AND REGULATION
2-1 to 2-110 (2d ed. 1997) (discussing fiduciary obligations of brokers).
63 See, e.g., Fidelity Investments: Know what you own and
know why you own it, (visited Oct. 6, 1998) <http://www.fidelity.com/
planning/investment> (providing online service where individual
account information co-exists with educational information and access
is a mouse-click away).
62
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investing.64 In such cases, the linkage would occur
throughout a profile: when, for example, a fund discusses
its risks and identifies the appropriate kind of investor for
the fund, it could point the investor by a hypertext link
specifically to educational materials on risk, asset
allocation and life-cycle investing. 65 Even if an investor
relies on a written profile, a fund could accompany it with
a basic investor education booklet to which the profle
could be cross-referenced, just as funds now send an
fund services to accompany a
investor a handbook on
66
profile or a prospectus.
With industry consultation, the SEC must work out the
details of the linkage, which means that it would need to
submit an amending rule proposal regarding the profile
and the new prospectus format. 67 An obvious concern
would be how to introduce an investor to the need for
education and to provide cross-references without adding
to the size or complexity of the profile. The SEC would have
6 See YANKELOVICH PARTNERS INC., 1997 ANNUAL SIA INVESTOR SURVEY:
12 (Nov. 1997)
(referring to growing numbers of investors who use personal computers
to obtain investment information and to trade).
65 In all its disclosure simplification initiatives, the SEC worries about
confusing a consumer by providing cross-references. Yet the electronic
delivery of disclosure documents and educational materials, with their
hypertext links, ensures that the use of cross-references does not
impede reading and comprehension, because a reader can access them
so easily and then return without difficulty to the main document.
6 Funds now send investors such educational booklets. See, e.g.,
INVESTORS' ATTITUDES TOWARDS THE SECURITIES INDUSTRY

CHARLES SCHWAB, THE ESSENTIAL INVESTOR (1997); FIDELITY INVESTMENTS,
MANAGING RISK IN YOUR PORTFOLIO: A FIDELITY GUIDE FOR EXPERIENCED

INVESTORS (1995) (describing risk, risk management and asset
allocation); MERRILL LYNCH, YOU AND YOUR MONEY: A FINANCIAL HANDBOOK
FOR WOMEN INVESTORS (1997): THE VANGUARD GROUP, THE VANGUARD
INVESTMENT PLANNER: A GUIDE TO ASSET ALLOCATION (1996). The SEC

understands and accepts that a fund might send a handbook that
supplies information about multiple funds together with a profile or
prospectus. See Final Registration Release, supra note 8, at 13,954
(explaining how fund can separate out fund purchase and redemption
information in separate document, incorporate it by reference in
prospectus and distribute it to investors).
67
The SEC might also issue a concept release on investor education.
See Fanto, supra note 6. The SEC could make this proposal regarding
the linkage in its concept release.
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to draft a simple legend, in "plain English," to be placed at
the beginning of the profile, that encouraged investors to
use a company's educational materials and services, and it
would also have to identify the key items, and appropriate
language, for educational cross-references. The logical
items for such cross-reference are those involving a fund's
objectives, strategies, risks and returns, and fees (the first
four profile items). In addition, the SEC will want a fund to
make some reference to the SEC's own anti-fraud
education materials and to the availability of education
providers unaffiliated with the fund. One possible legend
incorporating all such educational references would be the
following:
You should decide whether an investment in the [fund]
is suitable to your personal circumstances and fits with
your other investments. For help in making this
decision, you should consult your broker or financial
advisor, if you have one, and the investor education
materials of [fund company], which are available at
[provide reference/web site link] and to which this
profile will occasionally refer. The Securities and
Exchange Commission will also direct you to other
education providers, as well as help you protect yourself
against investment fraud and abuse (please call
[telephone number] or go to the Commission's Internet
68
site, www.sec.gov).
And the SEC would have to consider providing companies
with a "safe harbor" from any liability for the educational
6

The new disclosure format has reduced the "clutter" of legends and

cross-references in the fund prospectus, but still provides for some
general ones pointing investors to other documents. See, e.g., Final
Registration Release, supra note 8, at 13,948 (providing legends that
refer investors outside prospectus to fund's annual and semi-annual
reports, Statements of Additional Information and even to SEC web
site). If a fund company does not provide educational services, it could
link its disclosure documents to the services of the ICI or of the
brokerage firms through which the fund is sold. Cf., il.(allowing a fund
sold through a broker to indicate that further information about the
fund is available with the broker or another financial intermediary).
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materials, for fund companies would be reluctant to make
69
educational references if it enhanced their liability risks.
The SEC has begun to recognize the value of private
70
educational services provided by fund companies.
Additional profile reform in line with the above suggestion
could be a significant opportunity for the SEC publicly to
acknowledge the developments in investor education by
financial firms and nonprofit organizations and to
encourage consumers to use these educational services.
As such, the reform would fit well in the national campaign
relating to investor education on pension investing and the
SEC's own recent efforts to improve the position of
ordinary investors in the securities markets.
V. CONCLUSION
The current focus on investor education is necessary in
this country as individuals bear the responsibility for their
retirement future through their own saving and investing.
It is not known how much education will improve the
investing performance of ordinary investors, and
educational efforts should not foreclose other ways of
helping Americans (particularly those with lower incomes)
prepare for retirement. If, however, education is not
effective, the consequences may indeed be grim, as wealth
disparities increase through generations and as other,
more politically charged solutions might be needed to
address the plight of the elderly in retirement. Moreover,
69 Cf., 15 U.S.C. § 77b(a)(10)(a) (1997) (exempting supplementary
sales literature from the prospectus definition); 17 C.F.R. § 230.135a
(1998) (providing that generic advertising for mutual funds will not be
deemed to offer security for sale when certain conditions are met). The
most sensible approach might well be to exempt educational materials
from
the definition of a prospectus.
70
See Levitt, supra note 36, at 2 (praising publicly the educational
activities of private firms); Rachel Witmar, SEC Wants Mutual Funds
Voluntarily To Disclose Risk, Fee Data, BarbashConfirms, 30 SEC. REG.

& L. REP. 1006, 1007 (No. 27, July 3, 1998) (reporting that then SEC
Director of Investment Management Barry Barbash (as well as Mike
Miller of Vanguard) "focused on the need to educate investors beyond
the prospectus and other official fund documents, through brochures,
the Internet, and the media").
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the need for investor education for the ordinary investor is
a salutary reminder to those who focus exclusively on
institutions in the securities markets and on pension fund
capitalism. 7 1 Behind those institutions stand ordinary
investors who place money in a 401(k) plan, an individual
retirement account or a brokerage account and must
decide how to invest it. If such investors lose confidence in
the markets, the impact could be tremendous.
Financial regulators like the SEC have, therefore, no
choice but to consider investor education in all of their
regulations affecting ordinary investors, even if it presents
new challenges to them. This Article argues that, in its
profile initiative, the SEC exhibits the appropriate
educational focus by adopting a simplified format, the
profile, for presenting fund information, by encouraging
fund companies to conduct some education in their profile
disclosure, and, most importantly, by having them present
information that invites the investor to apply to it investor
education principles. Because so many fund companies,
fund organizations, nonprofit groups and even the SEC
itself now provide educational materials and services, the
SEC should simply take the next step and facilitate the
connection between the profile and these educational
materials. To do so would promote the education that
ordinary investors so desperately need.

71

See,

e.g.,

MICHAEL

USEEM,

INVESTOR

CAPITALISM:

How

MONEY

(1996) (in a
discussion of the relations between public corporations and their
shareholders he all but dismisses the ordinary investor).
MANAGERS ARE CHANGING THE FACE OF CORPORATE AMERICA
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Self-Direction
Participant
Account Balances: Investment
Advice or Investment Education?
Marcia S. Wagner and Robert N. Eccles *
With the exponential growth of pension plans
established pursuant to section 401(k) of the Internal
2
Revenue Code (the "Code")' more and more employees are
responsible for making the investment decisions on which
the comfort and security of their retirement years will
depend. In other words, where professional trustees and
investment managers once, practically exclusively,
invested pension plan assets, more and more plans are
providing that participants themselves invest their
pension plan assets.
Freed of the responsibility for investing pension plan
assets or hiring professionals to do so, employers have
nonetheless been concerned about the competence of their
employees to direct the investment of those assets. To
assist their employees in directing the investment of their
pension plan assets, some employers have hired others to
provide employees with either investment education or
investment advice. Providing investment education means
providing investment information to employees to assist
them in making informed investment decisions - without
Marcia S. Wagner has her own law firm, Marcia S. Wagner, Esq. &
Associates, P.C., Boston, Massachusetts. Robert N. Eccles, is a partner
at O'Melveny & Myers, Washington, D.C. The authors were counsel to
Trust Company of the West in receiving Prohibited Transaction
Exemption 97-60. Marcia S. Wagner has also written on the issues
discussed in this Article in The Provision of Investment Advice Under
ProhibitedTransactionExemption 97-60, TAx MANAGEMENT COMPENSATION
PLANNING JouRNAL 3-10 (Jan. 2. 1998).
1I.R.C. § 401(k) (1998) (providing for cash or deferred arrangements).
2 Although this Article refers to persons with pension plan assets for
which they direct the investment as employees or participants, the
same principles apply to beneficiaries of pension plan assets who direct
the investment of those assets. Thus, the word participant in this
Article should be read to include both employees and beneficiaries
where appropriate.
*
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providing employees with the kind of individualized
investment information that constitutes investment
advice. In this context, for investment information to be
considered investment advice, the information must be
understood to be "a primary basis for investment decisions
with respect to plan assets" and must be individualized
and based on the particular needs of the participant
"regarding such matters as, among other things,
or strategy, overall portfolio
investment policies
3
of plan investments."
diversification
or
composition
The first section of this Article summarizes4
Department of Labor (DOL) Interpretive Bulletin 96-1,
concerning investment education. The second section
describes a prohibited transaction exemption received by
Trust Company of the West (TCW) to permit it to offer5
investment advice to certain pension plan participants.
The third section explains the advantages of the
investment advisory approach.
I. DOL INTERPRETIVE BULLETIN 96-I
A. BACKGROUND
A person who is otherwise a fiduciary with regard to
pension plan assets over which a participant has
investment control is not responsible for any losses that6
result from the participant's exercise of such control.
Thus, a plan sponsor, subject to regulations adopted by
DOL, 7 can set up an employee pension plan that has
individual accounts for each employee and for which each
participant, not the plan sponsor, is responsible for
managing the investments ("individually directed pension
plan").
3 29 C.F.R. § 2510.3-21(c) (1998).
4 Interpretive Bulletin Relating to Participant Investment Education
[hereinafter Interpretive Bulletin], 29 C.F.R. § 2509.96-1 (1998).
5 Prohibited Transaction Exemption 97-60 [hereinafter PTE], 62 Fed.
Reg. 59,744 (1997).
6 Employee Retirement Income Security Act of 1974, as amended
(ERISA) § 404(c)(1)(B), 29 U.S.C. § 1104(c)(1)(B) (1998).
7 29 C.F.R. § 2550.404c-1 (1998).

https://digitalcommons.law.villanova.edu/vjlim/vol1/iss1/1

86

Frankel: Trends in the Regulation of Investment Companies and Investment A

(VOL. 1:87 1999) PARTICIPANT SELF-DIRECTION

89

A plan sponsor may still have fiduciary responsibility
for investment advice provided to a participant who directs
the investment of his or her individual account assets if
the sponsor provides the participant with investment
advice for compensation. 8 A service provider hired by a
plan sponsor to advise participants would also be a
fiduciary with respect to the individually directed pension
plan. Moreover, a sponsor who hired a service provider to
provide participants with investment advice would be
required by the Employee Retirement Income Security Act
of 1974 (ERISA) to be prudent in the choice of a fiduciary
to provide investment advice 9 and could even be subject to
co-fiduciary liability with the investment adviser if the plan
sponsor chose imprudently.' 0
B. DOL CLARIFIES WHEN PARTICIPANT INVESTMENT
EDUCATION IS NOT INVESTMENT ADVICE

Because DOL shared the concern of many employers
that employees might not be competent to direct the
investment of their individually directed pension plan
assets,"1 the Department issued Interpretive Bulletin 96-1
on June 11, 1996. The purpose of the Interpretive Bulletin
is to encourage plan sponsors to provide participants with
investment information without concern on the part of the
sponsor about the fiduciary duties the sponsor might
assume if the investment information provided were
considered to be investment advice. The Interpretive
Bulletin accomplishes this by clarifying when investment
8 ERISA § 3(21)(A)(ii), 29 U.S.C. §1002(21)(A)(ii) (1998).
9Specifically, a plan sponsor must act "prudently and in the sole
interest of plan participants and beneficiaries...... Interpretive Bulletin,
29 C.F.R. § 2509.96-1(e) (1998).
,oSee id. Specifically, the Interpretive Bulletin provides:
[t]he designation of an investment advisor to serve as a fiduciary may
give rise to co-fiduciary liability if the person making and continuing

such designation in doing so fails to act prudently and solely in the
interest of plan participants and beneficiaries; or knowingly
participates in, conceals or fails to make reasonable efforts to correct
a known breach by the investment advisor. Id.
I See Interpretive Bulletin, 29 C.F.R. § 2509.96-1 (b) (1998).
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education is not "investment advice" for purposes of the
12
definition of "fiduciary" in section 3(21)(A)(ii) of ERISA.
Specifically, the Interpretive Bulletin describes "a series of
graduated safe harbors under ERISA for plan sponsors
and service providers who provide participants and
beneficiaries with four increasingly specific categories of
investment information and materials - plan information,
general financial and investment information, asset
13
allocation models and interactive investment materials."
Neither of the first two safe harbors - for plan
information and general financial and investment
information applies to information about specific
investment alternatives available to participants under a
plan. In contrast, the third and the fourth safe harbors
permit the use in investment education materials of specific
investment models incorporating actual investment
alternatives available under the plans offered to
participants. The use of the models in participant
investment education materials is subject to the following
restrictions.
The third safe harbor - for asset allocation models permits a plan sponsor or service provider to make
available to employees models "of asset allocation
portfolios of hypothetical individuals with different time
horizons and risk profiles, where:
(i) Such models are based on generally accepted
investment theories that take into account the historic
returns of different asset classes (e.g., equities, bonds,
or cash) over defined periods of time;
(ii) all material facts and assumptions on which
such models are based (e.g., retirement ages, life
expectancies, income levels, financial resources,
replacement income ratios, inflation rates, and rates of
return) accompany the models;
12The Interpretive Bulletin does not address the question of when
advice is provided for compensation. Interpretive Bulletin, 29 C.F.R. §
2509.96-1(b) (1998).
13 Interpretive Bulletin, 61 Fed. Reg. 29,586, 29,586 (1996).
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(iii) to the extent that an asset allocation model
identifies any specific investment alternative available
under the plan, the model is accompanied by a
statement indicating that other investment alternatives
having similar risk and return characteristics may be
available under the plan and identifying where
information on those investment alternatives may be
obtained; and
(iv) the asset allocation models are accompanied
participants or
by a statement indicating that . .
beneficiaries should consider their other assets,
income, and investments . . . in addition to their
14
interests in the plan."
The fourth safe harbor - for interactive investment
materials - permits a plan sponsor or service provider to
make available to participants materials, including
worksheets, questionnaires and software, that enable the
participant to estimate his or her own future retirement
income needs and to "assess the impact of different asset
allocations on retirement income" as long as there is "an
objective correlation between the asset allocations
generated by the materials and the information and data"
provided by the plan sponsor or service provider and as
long as restrictions similar to the ones applied to asset
allocation models are met. 15
C. ASSUMPTION OF RESPONSIBILITY UNDER
INTERPRETIVE BULLETIN 96-1
The Interpretive Bulletin also makes clear that hiring a
person to provide investment educational services to
participants in individually directed pension plans is "an
exercise of discretionary authority or control with respect
to management of the plan"'16 just as is the hiring of a
person to provide investment advisory services. 17 Thus, the
Interpretive Bulletin, 29 C.F.R. § 2509.96-i(d)(3) (1998).
§ 2509.96-1(d)(4).
16 Id. § 2509.96-1(e).
17 See supra notes 9-10 and accompanying text.
14
5

1 Id.
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act of employing a service provider to provide investment
educational services is subject to the prudent man
standard of care in section 404(a) of ERISA. 18 A plan
sponsor must be prudent in selecting (and continuing to
retain) a service provider, even though the sponsor neither
has liability for the education provided nor for the
consequences of investment decisions made by participants
who have received the education.
II. PROHIBITED TRANSACTION EXEMPTION 97-60
A. BACKGROUND

Although the Interpretive Bulletin provided guidance
for plan sponsors who wish to offer investment education
to participants, it did not offer comparable guidance for
sponsors who wish to offer participants more significant
assistance in the form of investment advice. As noted
above, the act of hiring someone to provide investment
advice to an individually directed pension plan is a
fiduciary act. In addition, a service provider hired to
provide plan participants with investment advice is a
fiduciary. 19 Moreover, if the service provider also offers the
investment alternatives about which participants are
receiving investment advice, then the service provider may
have committed a transaction prohibited by ERISA unless
the service provider has received an exemption from the
application of provisions of that Act.
The following is a description of one program under
which investment advice may be offered to certain pension
plan participants and the prohibited transaction exemption
that permits .the offer of the program under specified
conditions. For reasons set forth in a later section of this
Article, 20 the authors believe that the conditions for receipt of
the prohibited transaction exemption would also protect
participants from breaches of fiduciary responsibility by the
sponsor and the service provider and, thus, lessen the
1829 U.S.C. § 1104(a) (1998).
19See supra notes 8-10 and accompanying text.
20 See infra note 46 and accompanying text.
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liability for any sponsor who hired a service provider with a
similar prohibited transaction exemption to provide
investment advice to participants.

B. DESCRIPTION OF THE
TCW PORTFOLIO SOLUTIONS PROGRAM
21
In Prohibited Transaction Exemption 97-60 (PTE),
DOL granted exemptive relief22 under section 408(a) of
ERISA23 and section 4975(c)(2) of the Code 24 on behalf of
The TCW Group, Inc., and its wholly owned subsidiaries
TCW and TCW Funds Management, Inc., the investment
25
adviser to the TCW Galileo Funds, Inc. ("Galileo Funds").
In the PTE, DOL considered TICW Portfolio Solutions," a
program under which TCW could render investment
advice to participants in individually directed pension
plans. The program would provide an individual plan
participant responsible for the investment of his or her
account balance with a convenient way to benefit from the
knowledge and experience of professional investment
advisers and thereby receive advice concerning which of
the investment vehicles offered under the program would
represent an appropriate allocation of the assets in that
individual's account.

PTE, 62 Fed. Reg. 59,744 (1997).
The relief granted was from the application of section 406(b) of
ERISA to certain proposed transactions involving TCW and fiduciaries
of individually directed pension plans whose participants receive
investment advice from TCW.
TCW also received relief for the proposed purchase and sale by
individually directed pension plans of units in commingled trusts
described below and of shares of the Galileo Funds. The grant of relief
for the purchase and sale transactions is not discussed further in this
Article.
2329 U.S.C. § 1108(a) (1998).
24
I.R.C. § 4975(c)(2) (1998).
25
The Galileo Funds is a series mutual fund, an open-end investment
company, that has separate series that operate as individual mutual
funds. See generally PTE, 62 Fed. Reg. 59,744, 59,746 (1997).
21

22
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The program could be offered to independent
fiduciaries 26 of individually directed pension plans. 2 7 In
accordance with its responsibilities under Title I of
ERISA, 28 an independent fiduciary would have to review
the program before offering it under the pension plan.

1. TCW Portfolio Solutions Trusts
Under TCWs proposed program, TCW would
recommend to participants one of a number of trusts
maintained under the program or a money market fund or
similar vehicle 29 as an investment vehicle for the
participant's account balance. Multiple trusts would be
30
established, structured as separate commingled trusts.
Each trust would hold, in varying proportions, shares of
some or all of the mutual funds offered by the Galileo
Funds.
The mix of mutual funds in each commingled trust
would be designed to accommodate the investment needs
and risk tolerances of a different profile of a participant
with the salient factors being the participant's financial
objectives, time horizon, other savings and risk tolerance.
The trusts could range from aggressively structured
(generally comprised of mutual funds invested primarily in
equities), to conservatively structured (generally comprised
26

An independent fiduciary would be a fiduciary who has
discretionary authority with regard to an individually directed pension
plan and who is not affiliated with TCW. The term could include named
fiduciaries of the plan such as the plan sponsor or plan administrator or
any fiduciary responsible for selecting investment vehicles for the

pension
plan.
27

TCWs program would only be offered to sophisticated plans, that is

those
with a minimum of $5 million in plan assets.
28
See ERISA, Pub. L. No. 93-406, Title 1, 88 Stat. 832 (1974) (codified
as amended in 29 U.S.C.).
29 The money market fund or similar option would be provided so that
TCWs program could comply with the requirements of 29 C.F.R.
§ 2550.404c-1 (1998).
3°Each commingled trust would be a group trust, satisfying all
requirements of Revenue Ruling 81-100, 1981-1 C.B. 326, and thus,

qualifying for tax exemption under section 501(a) of the Code. I.R.C.
. 501(a) (1998).
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of mutual funds
instruments).

invested

95

primarily in fixed income

TCW would employ a financial expert to construct
appropriate asset allocation models for the commingled
trusts, using generally accepted principles of modem
portfolio theory. The financial expert would be
independent from and have no previous pre-existing
relationship with TCW or its affiliates. 31 The asset
allocation models would not be static, but rather the
financial expert, in its sole professional discretion, would
adjust them, taking into consideration the investment
goals and risk tolerances that the models represent and
changes in the economy and market conditions. The
financial expert would be solely responsible for deciding
how the models might best be implemented by selecting
the mutual funds each commingled trust held and the
weightings thereof.
The commingled trusts might comprise all or part of
the investment alternatives available to a participant in an
individually directed pension plan.
2. Investment Advice Offered to
Participants Under the Program
An integral part of the program would be the
investment advice offered to participants. TCW would
provide each plan participant with worksheets 32 that
would elicit from the participant his or her retirement
funding needs, risk tolerance and life cycle stage. Upon
completion of the worksheets, the participant's responses
would be analyzed and the participant would receive a
written recommendation from TCW of an appropriate
commingled trust.33 There would be no separate fee at the
31 In addition, no more than five percent of the financial expert's gross
income in any taxable year could be derived from TCW or its affiliates.
32 The worksheets would be formulated by an independent expert.
33 Because the worksheets would take into account risk tolerances,

TCW might find itself in the position of recommending a more

conservative commingled trust than would be the case if the worksheets
had only a mathematical basis with no behavioral or psychological
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trust level for the provision of this investment advice;
however, the costs of the program (for example, the costs of
developing and implementing the asset allocation models
and the worksheets) 34 would be paid by TCW and TCW
35
would be reimbursed for such expenses by the trusts.
Whether a participant elected to invest in the
recommended commingled trust would be entirely within
the participant's discretion. A participant might disregard
the recommended trust and invest in another trust.
Moreover, some participants might not elect to participate
in the asset allocation program at all, in such cases a
person independent of TCW, generally the participant,
would elect in which trust to invest the pension plan
assets.
3. Disclosure Under the Program
TCW would provide plan sponsors with full disclosure
concerning the composition of the commingled trusts and
concerning fees and expenses charged at the mutual fund
and the trust level. TCW also would provide sponsors with
a quantitative annual report by which each sponsor could
determine if the program had attained its objectives.
component. Since equity-based mutual funds provide TCW with higher
fees (and generally higher profits) than fixed-income mutual funds,
TCW would not necessarily maximize its short-term return by
incorporating the behavioral or psychological component into the
worksheets.
34 Other trust level expenses would include expenses payable to
regulatory authorities, accounting, auditing and legal expenses, clerical
and administrative expenses, expenses of printing and mailing reports,
expenses for computer programmers, certain insurance and fidelity
bond premiums and other expenses incurred by each commingled trust
in the ordinary course of its business.
35 Because TCW generally would pay for direct expenses and then
seek reimbursement from the commingled trusts, the payment of
expenses could be viewed as an extension of credit between a plan and a
party-in-interest prohibited under sections 406(a)(1)(B), 406(a)(1)(D)
and 406(b)(2) of ERISA. 29 U.S.C. §§ 1106(a)(1)(B), 1 106(a)(1)(D) and
1106(b)(2) (1998). However, relief likely would be available under
Prohibited Transaction Class Exemption 80-26, 45 Fed. Reg. 28,545
(1980) concerning interest free loans between a plan and a partyin-interest.
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Finally, participants also would receive full disclosure
concerning the composition, operating costs, and
historical performance of the commingled trusts and a
description of the Galileo Funds before directing their
account balances.
C. EXEMPTIVE RELIEF GRANTED BY PTE 97-60
Section 406(b) of ERISA36 prohibits a fiduciary from
dealing with a pension plan in the fiduciary's own interest
or for the fiduciary's own account; from acting on behalf of
a party whose interests are adverse to a plan in any
transaction involving the plan; or from receiving
consideration for the fiduciary's own account from a party
dealing with the plan in connection with a transaction
37
involving plan assets.
DOL gives several examples of transactions prohibited
by section 406(b) in a rule adopted under section 408(b)(2)
3629 U.S.C. §I 106(b) (1998).
37

Section 406(a) of ERISA prohibits a fiduciary with respect to an
employee benefit plan from causing the plan to engage in certain
prohibited transactions, including the sale or exchange of property
between a plan and a party-in-interest, the furnishing of services
between the plan and a party-in-interest and the transfer to, or use by
or for the benefit of, a party-in-interest of any assets of the plan. ERISA
§§ 406(a)(1)(A), 406(a)(1)(C) and 406(a)(1)(D), 29 U.S.C. §§ 1106(a)(1)(A),
1106(a)(1)(C) and 1106(a)(1)(D) (1998).
Section 408(b)(2) of ERISA provides that the prohibitions provided in
section 406 shall not apply to the provision of services "necessary for
the establishment or operation of the plan, if no more than reasonable
compensation is paid therefor." 29 U.S.C. § 1108(b)(2) (1998). DOL
regulations state that section 408(b)(2) of ERISA "does not contain an
29 C.F.R. §
exemption from acts described in section 406(b)......
2550.408b-2(a)(3) (1998). Although section 408(b)(2), thus, does not
resolve the question of whether TCWs program would involve
transactions prohibited under section 406(b), section 408(b)(2) would
apply to transactions that would otherwise be prohibited under section
406(a) of ERISA. Since an independent fiduciary of a sophisticated
benefit plan would have to decide to enroll in the program and TCW
would have every incentive to ensure that services were provided at the
Trust level in a cost effective manner because it would not profit from
providing such services, the authors believe that the provision of
services under the program should not be a violation of section 406(a) of
ERISA, because such transactions would likely be exempt under
section 408(b)(2) of ERISA.
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of ERISA. 38 Under DOL's second example, an investment
adviser ("C") by recommending the purchase of an
insurance contract on which C would receive a
commission from the insurance company, engages in an
act prohibited by section 406(b), even if C fully discloses
the reasons for the recommendation and the fact that it
will receive a commission, and even though an
independent fiduciary (a fiduciary of the plan independent
of C) considers the recommendation and approves the
transaction. Similarly, because TCW could be deemed to
be a fiduciary of individually directed pension plans
enrolled in its program by virtue of the investment advice it
would provide to participants in such plans, 39 TCW could
be deemed to engage in a prohibited transaction if it
advised a participant to invest in one of the more
aggressive equity-based commingled trusts because TCW
generally would receive higher net fees (and, thus could
receive higher net profits) from such trusts.
Because of the risk that an offer of investment advice
to participants in its program might be viewed as involving
an act of prohibited self-dealing, TCW sought and received
an exemption from the provisions of section 406(b) with
respect to the proffer of investment advice. In support of its
request, TCW noted that its proposed exemption was
similar to Prohibited Transaction Exemption 93-59
40
received by Prudential Mutual Fund Management, Inc.,
in which DOL permitted an investment adviser affiliated
with the applicant to evaluate and recommend a mutual
fund investment mix comprising mutual funds that were
advised by the applicant. TCW also cited the similar
41
exemption received by Shearson Lehman Brothers, Inc.
38 29 C.F.R. § 2550.408b-2(0 (1998).
39

Because the participants under the individually directed pension

plans often would be financially unsophisticated, it is anticipated that
any advice rendered by TCW would be relied upon by participants.
Therefore, provision of the advice could render TCW a fiduciary of the
plans according to the definition of fiduciary in section 3(21)(A) of
ERISA. See supra note 5 and accompanying text.
40 58 Fed. Reg. 47,290 (1993).
41 Prohibited Transaction Exemption 92-77, 57 Fed. Reg. 45,833
(1992).
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III. THE ADVANTAGES OF INVESTMENT ADVICE
OVER INVESTMENT EDUCATION
There are several advantages to a plan sponsor in
hiring a service provider who provides investment advice
rather than investment education.
First, the provider can give participants the
investment advice they desire and need. Consequently,
plan participation and retention rates should increase.
Second, any prohibited transaction
exemption
received by a service provider offering investment advice
would contain protective conditions that could protect the
plan sponsor as well as participants.
As noted above, a plan sponsor is responsible for the
selection and oversight of the service provider whether the
service provider is an educator or an adviser. 4 2 Because a
prohibited transaction exemption relieves liability from the
prohibitions of the self-dealing provisions of section 406 of
ERISA but does not provide relief from the responsibility of
prudence and care under section 404,4 3 DOL must, in
order to grant a prohibited transaction exemption, find
that the transaction is in the interests of plan
participants. 4 Therefore, DOL only grants exemptions that
incorporate
conditions and
procedures
that the
Department believes will ensure, to the greatest extent
possible, that the transactions it exempts are prudent.
42 See supra notes 9 and 16-18 and accompanying text. Also, as noted

above hiring by a plan sponsor of a person as an investment adviser

may result in co-fiduciary liability under section 405 of ERISA (29
U.S.C. § 1105) if the fiduciary hiring the adviser fails to carry out the
designation in a manner consistent with the general fiduciary
responsibility provisions of ERISA. See supra note 10 and
accompanying text. As a practical matter, the liability of a plan sponsor
in selecting TCW or any other fiduciary where conduct is circumscribed
by an exemption is no greater than the liability a plan sponsor would
incur
in selecting an educator.
43
ERISA § 408(a), 29 U.S.C. § 1108(a) (1998).
"Id. § 1108(a)(2).
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a
Similarly, DOL must also find that the terms of 45
transaction are protective of the rights of participants.
Accordingly, unless the Department is comfortable that
the terms of a transaction are favorable to participants, it
will not issue an exemption. It is not unusual for the
Department to insist that the terms of a transaction be
made more favorable to participants than the requester of
the exemption had initially proposed.
The caution of DOL has had a predictable result.
Exhaustive computer searches have failed to uncover any
case in which a party complying with the conditions of an
individual prohibited transaction exemption was held
liable for a breach of its fiduciary responsibilities. Further,
the authors have been unable to locate a single reported
case in which a fiduciary breach was even alleged against
such a person. Thus, as long as a service provider has a
prohibited transaction exemption, complies with the
conditions of that exemption, and fulfills its responsibilities
to the individually directed pension plans, a plan sponsor
could take comfort in the likelihood that its duties of
prudence and care in hiring the service provider have been
met. 46
Third, if a plan sponsor hired a service provider
offering investment advice, the sponsor would not have to
monitor whether the provider actually provided investment
education or investment advice. In contrast, if a plan
sponsor hired a service provider who claimed only to offer
investment education, the sponsor would have to monitor
45 Id. §1 108(a)(3).
46

A

plan

sponsor

would

have

had

to

have

made

an

initial

determination that the investment advice furnished by the service
provider would be likely to be helpful to its employees. Moreover, a
fiduciary who hires a service provider that performs well could still be

subject to equitable relief, such as removal, for not following proper
procedures in hiring the provider. See Brock v. Robbins, 830 F.2d 640,
648 (7th Cir. 1987). However, the disclosures that a service provider

would be required to make to receive a prohibited transaction
exemption are intended to ensure that proper procedures are used in
the selection process. For the information provided by TCW under its
program, see section II.B.3 of this Article (Disclosure Under the
Program), supra.
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whether the investment education provided slipped over
the line into investment advice. If the investment
education were actually investment advice, then the plan
sponsor might be found to have hired a fiduciary on behalf
of the plan, which fiduciary would not have received a
prohibited transaction exemption addressing any possible
self-dealing issues involved in the arrangement.
Fourth, hiring a service provider who offers investment
advice rather than investment education protects a plan
sponsor from certain ambiguities in the interplay of state
and federal law.
A service provider offering investment education may
be subject to state law, 47 rather than to ERISA. This may
permit an educator with a financial interest in which
investment vehicle a participant selects to skew the
investment education to lead to the selection of vehicles
that result in higher fees and profits for the educator
without liability for the educator under ERISA. Such a
scenario would enhance the possibility of liability under
ERISA for the plan sponsor for either improper selection or
inadequate monitoring of the educator.
Finally, many of the different state laws to which a
service provider offering investment education might be
subject may well have different standards than ERISA. If
an educator were held liable for a violation of state law, the
holding might be evidence in a federal court that a plan
sponsor had not satisfied ERISA's prudence requirement
in selecting and monitoring the educator. On the other
hand, if the educator were not held liable under state law
for something that would be a violation of ERISA because
47 See Coyne v. Selman, 98 F.3d 1457 (4th Cir. 1996); Curtis v.
Nevada Bonding, 53 F.3d 1023, 1027 (9th Cir. 1995); Dukes v. U.S.
Healthcare, Inc., 57 F.3d 350, 355 (3d Cir. 1995), cert. denied, 116
S. Ct. 564 (1995). In contrast, most state laws do not apply to a service
provider acting as a fiduciary to a pension plan subject to ERISA. See
ERISA § 514(a), 29 U.S.C. §I 144(a) (1998), which generally preempts
the application of all state laws to fiduciaries except for those laws that
relate to banking, insurance, securities, and generally applicable
criminal law.
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of less restrictive standards in the state law, the plan
sponsor might still be liable for the imprudent selection or
monitoring of the service provider since the less restrictive
state laws might have deprived the plan of a cause of
action against the educator.
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